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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL DISCLOSURES WITHIN FIXED-RATE PEER-TO-PEER 
LENDING MARKETS 
 
By 
 
Robert A. Jordan 
 
Financial journals have just begun to examine the implications of unsecured fixed-rate 
loans between lenders and borrowers administered over the internet. This study observes 
31,550 loans issued between June 2007 and April 2013 with a 36-month term, that are 
fully paid or charged off, based on a data set from the largest P2P lending website. Initial 
findings within peer-to-peer (P2P) lending markets have identified that social disclosures 
may influence these markets.   The result of this analysis unambiguously confirms social 
disclosures influence lenders and the factors significant for funding a loan are 
inconsistent with the factors significant to repayment of the loan. Prescriptive filters 
based on social disclosures can improve the likelihood of selecting a creditworthy 
borrower and increase the models explanatory power. The study finds that distinct forms 
of social disclosure and specific content within social disclosures predict the amount of 
funding received and probability of loan repayment.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Importance of the Problem 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending platforms democratize finance by enabling a more 
efficient flow of funds between capital-seekers and capital-providers. Historically, the 
financial systems of an economy consists of three main components: 1) financial markets, 
2) financial institutions, and 3) financial regulators (Merton, 1974; Schwienbacher, 
2010). This architecture has limited capital-providers in debt markets to only the wealthy 
and those capable of meeting the regulatory requirements imposed on financial 
institutions. Technology has disrupted this framework and opened access to previously 
closed financial markets in ways that were not possible merely ten years ago. The 
potential benefits to society through this financial revolution are limitless, however due to 
the infancy of these markets thoughtful research is required to ensure the perceived 
benefits are fully realized. In short, P2P lending has the potential to become a financial 
innovation that is parallel to the Savings Bank Movement of 1810
1
, or the Micro Finance 
Movement
2
. 
The benefits of crowdfunding are epitomized within the financial innovations of 
P2P lending. P2P lending was first introduced by the United Kingdom based Zopa 
Company (“Zopa”) established in 2005. Since the launch of Zopa, an estimated 52 active 
                                               
1 1 The impact of the Savings Bank Movement of 1810 enabled the economically disenfranchised of 
Dumfries, Ireland to gain financial independence through bank accounts earning 4% interest 
2 The Micro Finance movement started by the Grameen Bank in the 1970’s, provided underserved 
populations in Bangladesh access to capital for entrepreneurial endeavors. 
8 
 
P2P lending platforms can be found online
3
. These platforms act as the intermediary 
performing the matching function enabling capital-seekers and capital-providers to 
efficiently exchange information about security prices and offerings in order to overcome 
information asymmetries and minimize transaction costs (Bakos, 1991). The more a P2P 
lending platform is able to acquire and match borrowers to lenders the bigger the 
networking effect and overall success of the market (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Damiano 
& Li, 2008). From a market theory perspective, the economic rationale for the existence 
of financial institutions and instruments is related to transaction costs; thus, the surviving 
institutions and instruments are those that have the lowest transaction costs relative to 
potential benefits (Schwienbacher, 2010). The transaction costs are a key value 
proposition of P2P lending. Online lending platforms benefit from a lower cost of capital 
and transaction cost by having underwriting handled by a pool of lenders as opposed to a 
single bank. The borrowers benefit from lower interest rates for unsecured debt, and 
investors have the opportunity to earn above prime interest rates on their investments. 
Not to mention, P2P lending platforms create a simple non-threating online user 
experience for both amateur and expert investors alike. The loans appeal to borrowers 
seeking to consolidate or pay off credit card debt, repay high interest rate loans, or 
borrow funds for other general purposes.  P2P lending requires only weeks for borrowers 
to receive capital versus a longer more iterative process required in retail banking. Both 
P2P lending and traditional banks qualify borrowers in similar manners, however, in 
contrast to the traditional banking processes for unsecured loans, the P2P lending 
application process is completely online lowering overhead cost.  The human interaction 
                                               
3 http://www.p2p-banking.com/countries/germany-international-p2p-lending-statistics-february-
2017/#more-5573 
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required in brick and mortar traditional banking has been exchanged for social 
disclosures. Social disclosures are defined as voluntary information provided by the 
borrower within the loan descriptions or facilitated through online borrower and lender 
interactions on the P2P platform. Social disclosures are a financial innovation and a 
paradigm shift that is ushering in a new area of debt market research. 
Leading financial journals suggests that a close relationship between banks and 
borrowers reduces information asymmetries and improves borrowers’ access to credit 
which leads to an overall improvement in their performance (Castelli, Dwyer, & Hasan, 
2006). This notion is supported by Diamond’s (1991) demonstration that a successful 
bank relationship lowers the equilibrium probability of default.  Further, Rajan (1992) 
finds informational asymmetries are reduced for small businesses based on the length of 
time of their relationship with their lender and the number of creditors the firm uses.  
This concept is also consistent with Von Thadden’s (1995) view that the efficiency of an 
investment is improved by a debt contract with periodic monitoring. This line of 
argument suggests that a closer bank relationship will be associated with better firm 
performance, and that a borrower’s optimal strategy is to establish a long-term 
relationship and to borrow from one, or a limited number of banks. In stark contrast, the 
P2P environment is a market where borrowers are relatively numerous and participate in 
the market sufficiently infrequently to not acquire relationships with the lenders. The new 
relationship forged between borrowers and lenders is based solely on their online 
interactions through social disclosures which forms the basis for the research problem.  
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Foundational Theory 
P2P lending is consistent with the fundamental principles of Two-sided Market 
Theory, Financial Intermediation Theory, and Agency Theory. Two-sided markets are 
characterized by multiple sets of groups interacting through an intermediary (Allen & 
Santomero, 1997; Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Damiano & Li, 2008). Value is created in 
two-sided markets by enabling direct interactions between two distinct groups. The 
interactions create positive and negative same-side network effects. Members of one 
group exhibit a preference regarding the number of users in the other group.  Borrowers 
and Lenders represent the two groups in the P2P lending market. Specifically, the 
Lending Club platform is structured as a per transaction charge two-sided market, where 
investors pay Lending Club a service fee equal to one percent (1%) of the amount of any 
borrower payments received within 15 days of the payment due date. Positive same-side 
benefits are produced by increasing the number for lenders enabling more loans to be 
fully funded. Additionally, borrowers exhibit a preference for more lenders in order to 
increase the likelihood of having loans fully funded. 
Financial Intermediation Theory details the exchange relationships and 
functionalities of capital-providers providing funds to an intermediary institution, and the 
financial institution providing funds to capital-seekers (Allen & Santomero, 1997). 
Intermediaries overcome asymmetric information problems by acting as delegated 
monitors that perform the function of converting risky investments into lower risk 
investments through diversification and matching small deposits with large loans and 
large deposits with small loans. Accordingly, the purpose of financial intermediaries is to 
resolve market imperfections. In a perfect market, savers and investors have perfect 
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information to identify each other directly and the financial intermediary’s role becomes 
less important. P2P lending platforms further disintermediation by providing direct 
borrower contact to a pool of lenders. Lending Club still performs delegated monitoring, 
diversification, and matching functions, but bypasses traditional banking by facilitating 
the channeling of funds directly between lenders and borrowers. 
Agency Theory is also present in P2P lending from information asymmetries 
when the risk-taking party knows more about its intentions than the party paying the 
consequences (Akerlof, 1970).  In other words, the motivation to act in a self-interested 
manner results in moral hazards where the actions of one party change to the detriment of 
another after the financial transaction. Consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
agency costs are incurred via monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding 
expenditures by the agent, and the residual loss. In P2P lending, borrowers are motivated 
to act in their own best interests (Jensen, 1976). The true intent of the borrower’s loan 
purpose is unknown to lenders at the time of investment and creates a moral hazard for 
borrowers and adverse selection problem within the Lending Club P2P environment. As a 
result, when borrowers miss payments and loans become late Lending Club charges 
monitoring fees and residuals losses occur in the form of collections and default. 
Borrower default is a consequence of moral hazard and a key component of the research 
problem.  
 
The Research Problem 
 
In contrast to previous literature predicated on face-to-face borrower and lender 
relationships, advances in technology enable P2P platforms to conduct social 
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intermediation from geographically dispersed locations. Despite these innovations, the 
benefits of this new market are not completely understood due to new forms of 
information asymmetries.  
It is currently unclear whether social disclosures are inadvertently or advertently 
being used by borrowers with poorer credit ratings to manipulate lenders (Berkovich, 
2011; Herzenstein, Sonenshein, & Dholakia, 2011; Iyer, Khwaja, Luttmer, & Shue, 
2009). The national debt-to-income ratio for consumer is 11.66% compared to 13.81% 
for Lending Club borrowers (Emekter, Tu, Jirasakuldech, & Lu, 2015). Based on this 
figure alone, it is reasonable to assume poorer quality borrowers, “lemons”, are attracted 
to P2P lending and will have an incentive to produce flattering social disclosures. 
Conversely, by ignoring social disclosures on P2P platforms the positive benefits to 
lenders and potential financial innovations could be lost. This research analyzes whether 
P2P lenders can reduce information asymmetries through social disclosure information 
provided by borrowers on the leading fixed-rate P2P lending platform.  Ambiguity exists 
in understanding the determinants of creditworthiness from social disclosures and the 
subsequent impact on fixed-rate peer-to-peer lending platforms. This study is designed to 
address this problem by testing the social disclosures lenders are able to observe and their 
impact on funding time, investment, loan repayment and default.  
 
Contributions of the Study 
 
The literature has yet to fully understand and test the effects of information 
produced by social disclosures within P2P markets. It would be intellectually dishonest to 
overlook the adverse selection, selection biases, and moral hazards inherent in the P2P 
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market where the lender has less knowledge of the borrowers’ creditworthiness than the 
borrower and anonymity and geography between lenders and borrowers is high (Akerlof, 
1970). In the absence of relationship banking described in the seminal work of Rajan 
(1992), the significance of social disclosures as a substitute for human interaction is of 
increased importance. Moreover, both good and bad borrowers are cognizant of the 
asymmetric information risk and may have a competitive incentive to obfuscate 
creditworthiness to lenders through social disclosures. Financial economists have a 
vested interest and responsibility for understanding these dynamics of P2P lending 
especially within an unsecured debt market where no collateral is backing the borrower’s 
loan. The ability for lenders to separate good and bad borrowers might be possible 
through analysis of the social disclosures provided on the lending platform. This study 
combines multiple social disclosure analysis approaches found in the current stream of 
literature to answer this question.  
This is the first study of its kind that observes social disclosures within a fixed-
rate P2P platform. The majority of previous studies focus on reverse auction lending 
formats. Literature on reverse auction P2P lending platforms is fundamentally different 
due to negative same-side market effects from lender competition, whereas additional 
lenders on P2P fixed-rate platforms are a positive same-side market effect. Moreover, the 
reverse auction format for P2P lending has been abandoned by the leading P2P lenders in 
favor of fixed-rate models and the change has created a void in the current literature. 
Furthermore, the data and variables used in this analysis is no longer provided by the 
Lending Club platform in any format for the sample period of June 2007 through April 
2013. This study also incorporates the methodologies of related social disclosure peer-
14 
 
reviewed articles from Herzenstein et al. (2011), Lewis (2011), and Michels (2012). The 
culmination of multiple approaches into one study enables this research to observe the 
interaction between a wide-array of social disclosure explanatory variables found to be 
significant in previous studies. The results from this analysis are designed to fill the void 
by unambiguously identifying the social disclosures that influence lenders to invest in a 
loan and the social disclosures significant for borrower repayment of the loan. Thus, 
studying social disclosures on a fixed interest rate lending platform is a primary area of 
inquiry in this research and a principal contribution to the field of finance.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
Review of Literature 
 
 
Debt-based P2P Lending Literature Review 
 
Overall, debt-based crowdfunding research related to social disclosures on fixed-
rate P2P lending platforms is limited.  To substantiate this claim a literature review 
beginning in chronological order was performed. The first paper reviewed was Bachmann 
et al. (2011)  “Online Peer-to-Peer Lending – A Literature Review”. In this article, 
Bachman discusses the main results of forty-three scientific articles related to peer-to-
peer lending. Feller, Gleasure, and Treacy (2013) provide a seminar review based on the 
different forms of crowdfunding and include discussion feedback from the group of 
crowdfunding researchers in attendance (Feller, Gleasure, & Treacy, 2013b). Six studies 
provided a comprehensive overview of the crowdfunding literature focusing on capital-
seeking, capital-providing, and the role of intermediary parties. Two P2P lending 
empirical studies, Mach , Carter, & Slattery (2014) and Emekter et al. (2015), have been 
produced related to pricing Notes and evaluating risk on fixed-rate P2P lending sites, but 
were limited to hard credit information on the Lending Club platform. In Table 1 a list of 
the major works and their contributions to the field are provided.  
  
16 
 
 
Table 1 Literature Review Key Findings 
Article Platform Key Findings 
Pope et al. (2011) Prosper Capital-providers have been shown to 
discriminate against capital-seekers based on 
profile photos, race, obesity, and appearance 
which challenges the value of social 
disclosures on Prosper. 
Herzenstein et al. 
(2011)  
Prosper Finds that herding behavior, defined as a 
greater likelihood of bidding in auctions with 
more existing bids, on P2P loan auctions on 
Prosper.com. The results of an empirical study 
provide evidence of strategic herding behavior 
by lenders such that they have a greater 
likelihood of bidding on an auction with more 
bids (a 1% increase in the number of bids 
increases the likelihood of an additional bid by 
15%), but only to the point at which it has 
received full funding. The study also finds a 
positive association between herding in the 
loan auction and its subsequent performance, 
that is, whether borrowers pay the money back 
on time. 
Herzenstein et al. 
(2011)  
 
Prosper Provides evidence of higher default rates from 
each additional borrower identity claim related 
to trustworthiness, personal success, economic 
hardship, work ethic, morality, and religion 
within a social disclosure. 
Lewis (2011) eBay Motors The study test whether bidder behavior is 
casually influenced by information on the 
auction web page. The study observes the 
information voluntarily disclosed along with 
hard characteristics such as model, year, 
mileage, transmission, and the accessories 
equipped on the vehicle.  
Michels (2012) Prosper Reports disclosures for high-risk borrowers 
increase bidding activity by 18.21% and each 
disclosure provided reduces default probability 
by 5.37%.  
Chen et al. (2012) Prosper Identifies a fundamental difference between a 
reverse auction model and fixed-rate model 
and that the auction model implies that the 
interest rate for a loan is a function of the 
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Article Platform Key Findings 
number of bids from interested capital-
providers. 
Lin et al. (2013) Prosper Performed an analysis on 4,139 social groups 
and verified friends using Prosper’s reverse 
auction platform and found borrower that had 
verified friends, defined as a friend that 
accepted a friend request from a borrower with 
a validated account, signaled positively at the 
1% significance level to lenders (Lin et al., 
2013).  
Chen et al. (2014) Prosper Investigated whether using an auction model 
in crowdfunding markets leads to an optimal 
result for market participants and found the 
reverse auction method was more complicated 
and less transparent than a fixed-rate model for 
capital providers. 
Mollick (2014) Kickstarter Finds factors such as word count, misspellings, 
updates, comments, duration, number of 
investors, and number of Facebook Friends 
signal higher quality using a dataset of over 
48,500 Kickstarter platform reward-based 
projects with combined funding over $237 
million. 
Mach et al. (2014) Lending Club Calculated loan performance for small 
business loans and proved business loans were 
250 times more likely for default compared to 
other loan categories.  
Emekter et al. 
(2015) 
Lending Club Uses Lending Club data to confirm that high 
credit grade, low debt-to-income ratio, high 
FICO score and low revolving line utilization 
are the most significant hard information 
factors associated with lower default risk. 
Dorfleitner et al. 
(2016) 
Auxmoney 
Smarva 
Analyzes two P2P lending markets: one with 
social disclosures and one that primarily uses 
hard information. The study finds social 
disclosure factors are important for lenders 
when hard financial information is not 
available. The study also finds that social 
disclosure factors do not have much predictive 
power with respect to default probability.  
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A recurring factor within the literature is that social disclosures heavily impact 
lender decision-making. Social disclosures allow borrowers to voluntarily provide any 
information they believe is important for lenders to make an investment decision. 
Common examples reviewed in the literature include personal information, loan purpose 
details, explanations for the borrower’s creditworthiness, and identity claims. Previous 
findings in the literature demonstrated that this form of information has a positive effect 
on establishing trust and influencing the likelihood of financing, lowering interest rates 
and decreasing the probability of loan default (Allison, Davis, Short, & Webb, 2015; 
Duarte, Siegel, & Young, 2012; Michels, 2012; Mollick, 2014; Pope & Sydnor, 2011).  
However, P2P lending studies demonstrate that the impacts of social disclosures on loan 
performance, in terms of default, are inconsistent. 
For example, Dorfleitner et al. (2016) finds interest rate and hard facts are the 
main drivers of the default probability. The study also finds that social disclosure factors 
are important to loan funding, but social disclosures do not significantly predict default 
probability (Dorfleitner et al., 2016).  This differs from Michels (2012) that reports 
explanatory disclosures increase bidding activity and each disclosure provided reduces 
default probability for higher risk borrowers. Conversely, Herzenstein et al. (2011) 
provides evidence of higher default rates when borrowers provide identity claims related 
to trustworthiness, personal success, economic hardship, work ethic, morality, and 
religion within a loan listing. While Lewis (2011) finds that if borrowers include 
qualifying words to describe an asset the likelihood of funding and default changes 
significantly. The findings from these works are not mutually exclusive. Further, they do 
not account for a social disclosure that expresses creditworthiness using credit 
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explanations, identity claims, and qualifying phrases within the same disclosure. Thus, a 
comprehensive side-by-side analysis of each approach is necessary and performed in this 
study. 
 
Text Analysis 
On a surface level, text analysis on social disclosure have been shown to influence 
perceptions of quality across crowdfunding markets in general (Mollick, 2014; Pitschner 
& Pitschner-Finn, 2014). Mollick (2014) and Pitschner et al. (2014) provide a framework 
for crowdfunding research by focusing on measuring the probability of an entrepreneur 
reaching a desired funding goal by analyzing the total number of funding providers, 
Project goal, Funding level, Backers, Category, Updates, Comments, Duration, Word 
Count, Misspellings, and the total dollar amount provided on crowdfunding platforms 
(Meer, 2014; E. R. Mollick, 2012; Pitschner & Pitschner-Finn, 2014). A subset of these 
factors such as Word Count, Misspellings, Updates, and Comments are also applicable to 
social disclosures on P2P lending platforms. The forms of social disclosures proven to be 
significant within fundraising markets, has yet to be fully tested within P2P fixed-rate 
markets to my knowledge.  On crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter, social 
disclosures are provided in the form of “Comments” and “Updates” in which investors 
can express enthusiasm or displeasure about the loan, product or project. Updates 
represent efforts by entrepreneurs to reach out to current and potential investors in order 
to reduce information asymmetries (Mollick, 2014).  Comments represent questions that 
current and potential investors may have about the opportunity. This information is 
publicly available to all investors for decision making purposes (Mollick, 2014).  
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Specifically, Mollick (2014) descriptive statistics found the chance of success for projects 
with spelling errors is 13% less than those without errors and not providing timely 
Updates to investors reduces the chance of funding success by just over 13%. In addition 
to Mollick (2014), Pitschner et al. (2014) finds Word Count significant across all models 
in their study, however, the research only observed non-profit organizations. 
Interestingly, the aforementioned studies have elected to not analyze the overall quality 
of the social disclosures in terms of readability. This study includes such a measure 
through the Flesch Index reading score that calculates text readability and the grade level 
of a loan description narrative. 
Identity Claims 
Previous literature has proven that social disclosures play an important role in 
mitigating information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders (Berger & Udell, 
1995; Petersen & Rajan, 1994). However, the first content analysis incorporated into this 
study, Herzenstein et al. (2011), finds identity claims written in borrower loan narratives 
can also adversely influence lender decisions. Identity claims are defined as personal 
character qualifying words used by the borrower in their loan descriptions. The six 
identity claims used in the study are categorized as trustworthy, economic hardship, 
hardworking, successful, moral, and religious. Each claim is coded as a dichotomous 
variable that receives a value of zero or one and the number of identity claims within 
each narrative was found to influence both loan funding and performance. Herzenstein et 
al. (2011) finds that unverifiable information affects lending decisions above and beyond 
the influence of objective verifiable information. The Herzenstein et al. (2011) article 
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uses data from the peer-to-peer lending website Prosper.com and a data set is comprised 
of 2006 and 2007 loans which operated under the reverse auction model. Under this 
model lenders competed on loans by bidding down the interest rate until the loan auction 
ended. Herzenstein et al. (2011) conclusions suggest that identity claims can be used to 
mask the borrower’s true creditworthiness. The number of identities that borrowers claim 
in their narratives were positively correlated with the probability of default, while the 
funded amount and number of identity claims were positively correlated. In other words, 
as the number of identity claims increased the funding increased, but default rate also 
increased.  This finding suggests the existence of a moral hazard that encourages bad 
actors to increase the number of identity claims in order to spur investment that 
ultimately results in higher default rates for lenders. At a more granular level of identity 
claims, a trustworthiness identity claim that reads “I am very reliable and trustworthy and 
always repay my debts,” was more likely to result in both funding and loan repayment 
(Herzenstein, Sonenshein, et al., 2011). These findings give reason to further study the 
specific content within social disclosures and suggest identity claims are significant for 
lenders investment decisions. 
Keywords and Qualifiers 
The word choice and word sequence has been found to play a role in online 
markets. The Lewis (2011) article test whether social disclosures provide sufficient detail 
to address information asymmetries in markets where anonymity and geography between 
buyers and sellers is high. In this market, buyers must solely depend upon the information 
provided on the car auction web page to evaluate quality and purchasing decisions. Lewis 
(2011) finds that use of negation, minimizing, and maximizing phrases causally influence 
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investor decision making on auction listings. The study observes the information 
voluntarily disclosed along with hard characteristics such as model, year, mileage, 
transmission, and the accessories equipped on the vehicle. Special attention is placed on 
the coding of key text phases and qualifier phrases. Lewis (2011) performs an analysis of 
the keywords “rust”, “scratch”, and “dent” used on the eBay Motors auction site and 
develops a corpus or words in order to code dummy variables for “no x,” meaning any 
negation; “small x,” meaning any favorable qualifier; “big x” implying an unfavorable 
qualifier, and “x,” meaning the phrase is used without qualification. Using the keyword 
“rust” as an example, Lewis (2011) created 4 dummies for rust: (1) "No Rust" (2) "Small 
Rust" (3) "Rust" and (4) "Big Rust". Lewis (2011) finds that a loan description that read 
“my car has no rust” has a positive impact on prices and the other three rust qualifier 
variables have negative effect. Lewis (2011) then performs hedonic regressions to 
deconstruct the price of an automobile sale into the cars component parts with a focus on 
photos and text. The analysis suggest that keywords and phrases provided through social 
disclosures are important for investors in online markets.  
 
Borrower Explanations 
Michels (2012) delved into the specific context of loan descriptions explanations 
to extract the importance of a borrower justifying their circumstances and ability to repay 
the loan. Michels (2012) finds that lenders are influenced by the unverifiable disclosures 
made by borrowers and receive lower interest rates as a result.  The Michel (2012) 
research supports the auction theory concept that disclosures deemed as credible help the 
lender gauge the value of the loan, therefore, increasing the number of bids. The study’s 
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results demonstrate that for each additional social disclosure there is a 1.27 percentage 
point reduction in interest rate and an 8 percent increase in bidding activity. These 
findings were derived from 500 manually coded loan listings from the Prosper P2P 
lending platform containing the presence of specific voluntarily provided unverified 
information. Specifically, Michels (2012) scored the purpose of the loan, income amount, 
income source, education, amount of other debt, interest rate on other debt, explanation 
for poor credit grade, listing of monthly expenses, and a picture of a person (presumably 
the borrower). For example, social disclosures related to education, clarifying poor credit, 
itemizing monthly expenses, lowering debt rate, and disclosing other amounts of debt 
would be scored if the borrower indicated the successful completion of an education 
program, explanation of life circumstances that led to poor credit, listed the dollar value 
of monthly expenses, stated the numerical interest rate on their other debts, or the 
borrower provided the dollar value of existing amounts of other debt owed.  Michels 
(2012) reports that explanations increase bidding activity by 18.21% and each disclosure 
provided reduces default probability by 5.37% for higher risk borrowers. The results of 
Michel (2012) indicate that disclosures influence lenders by increasing the number of 
bids and decreasing the interest rate charged on a loan. Furthermore, the analysis proves 
disclosures are more important for borrowers with poorer credit. 
Hard Credit Information 
Social disclosures within P2P lending represent a new innovation produced by 
web 2.0 technologies, however, verifying borrower information dates back to the first 
credit agency, The Retail Credit Company (now Equifax, Inc), was first founded in 1899. 
The Retail Credit Company began the credit reporting industry by collecting and selling 
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information on creditworthy customers based a person’s home, furnishings and character, 
among other factors (Myers & Forgy, 1963). P2P lenders collect similar information 
today to produce a borrower’s risk profile and loan grade. Previous work by Emekter 
(2015) uses Lending Club data to confirm that high credit grade, low debt-to-income 
ratio, high FICO score and low revolving line utilization are the most significant factors 
associated with lowering default risk. The significant credit information variables 
identified by Emekter (2015) successfully separates the good borrowers from the bad 
borrowers and decreases the probability of default to 5.36% for the highest grade A 
Lending Club loans (FICO 780+). However, the Emekter (2015) study does not account 
for verified information and the different implications that verified information produces. 
Lending Club has three states of verification: Income Verified, Income Source Verified, 
and Not Verified. Income Verified is regarding the actual income that the borrower 
indicated to be confirmed and the Income Source Verified is confirmation of where the 
income is originating from, such as retirement, self-employed, business, disability, or 
regular W-2 employment. In some instances, Lending Club will verify both the source 
and the actual income. Figure 1 Percentage of Loans with Income Verification, the 
Lending Club platform does not verify 100% of the income information for the issued 
loans which may explain the discrepancies in the Emekter et al. (2015) study between the 
highest risk grade G loans (FICO 640-659) having a 30.34% Charge Off rate compared to 
lower risk F graded loans (FICO 660-678) at a 33.08% Charge Off rate. Counter 
intuitively, if a borrower is selected by the Lending Club proprietary algorithms for 
Income Verification or Income Source Verification this might indicate that the borrower 
was detected as risky based on their loan application information. As seen in Figure 2 
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Percentage of Loans Charged Off by Income Verification, Not Verified loans outperform 
both Income Verified and Income Source Verified Loans, which raises questions that 
have not been answered in previous related studies
4
. 
The remainder of this study consists of multiple interrelated social disclosure 
concepts to determine if social disclosures can separate good borrowers from bad 
borrowers in fixed-rate P2P lending platforms. Beginning with Chapter 3, the different 
approaches for analyzing social disclosures are reviewed and hypotheses are formed for 
the unanswered questions. Following the review of social disclosure articles, Chapter 4 
provides the Data and Variable Descriptions, and Methodology that will be used to test 
the hypotheses, and the subsequent results. Chapter 5 summarizes the aforementioned 
contributions. Finally, the next areas of potential research are examined in the 
Conclusion. 
  
                                               
4 https://www.lendingclub.com/public/income-verification.action 
26 
 
Figure 1 Percentage of Loans with Income Verification 
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Figure 2 Percentage of Loans Charged Off by Income Verification 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
Hypotheses Development 
As demonstrated in Table 1, the majority of the literature on P2P lending has 
revolved around the Prosper.com (“Prosper”) reverse auction lending platform (D. Chen 
& Han, 2012; Duarte et al., 2012; Herzenstein, Sonenshein, et al., 2011; Lin, Prabhala, & 
Viswanathan, 2013; Michels, 2012; Pope & Sydnor, 2011). From 2005 to 2014, 
Prosper.com was the largest U.S. based firm. As of December 1, 2014, Prosper boasted 
over one million members and $2 billion in funded loans. Naturally, research was written 
within a reverse auction context where lenders competed against each other to offer 
borrowers the lowest interest rate. Multiple reverse auction studies support the ability of 
social disclosures to convey quality and influence lender behavior that can help minimize 
information asymmetries while reducing funding time and increasing the probability of 
funding (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013; Michels, 2012; Moritz & Block, 2016; 
Pope & Sydnor, 2011). However, studies have also found a fundamental difference 
between a reverse auction model and the fixed-rate model. The reverse auction model 
implies the interest rate for a loan is a function of the number of bids from interested 
capital-providers (D. Chen & Han, 2012). This format fosters an environment for buyer’s 
remorse where lenders are incentivized to submit bids that were not aligned to the 
borrower’s actual credit worthiness (Kawai, Onishi, & Uetake, 2014). Substantiating this 
finding, Chen et al. (2014) investigated and analyzed the results of the auction model 
used on Prosper and demonstrated the reverse auction method was more complicated and 
less transparent than a fixed-rate model for capital-providers (N. Chen, Ghosh, & 
29 
 
Lambert, 2014).  For these reasons, Prosper filed with the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to discontinue the reverse auction loan structure effective 
December 19, 2010 in favor of platform-established fixed-rates. 
The adoption of fixed-rate P2P lending platforms and documented issues with 
reverse auction lending markets has created unanswered questions in the literature 
concerning social disclosures. Platform-established fixed-rates now dominate the peer-to-
peer lending market, but only represent a fraction of the peer-reviewed literature. 
Accordingly, this study uses data from the Lending Club fixed-rate P2P platform, which 
eclipsed Prosper with over $15 billion in loans issued, as of March 2016. The key articles 
related to this study, Michels (2012) and Herzenstein et al. (2011), use data from the 
Prosper 1.0 reverse auction-lending platform that is no longer in operation, and Lewis 
(2011) uses the eBay Motors auction data that is limited to vehicle sales. Dorfleitner et al. 
(2016) study fixed-rate lending platforms but uses partial data from a third-party platform 
Wise Clerk to determine default. The data used from the Wise Clerk site is voluntarily 
provided and could be subject to selection bias. As a result, previous studies could not 
observe ex post loan default, were not collectively exhaustive in their analysis, or have 
been limited to auction formats.  
 
The properties of auction models are based on the assumptions that all of the 
bidders are risk-neutral, each bidder has a private valuation for the item independently 
drawn from some probability distribution, the seller possesses symmetric information 
about their own valuation of the item, and the payment is represented as a function of 
only the bids (McAfee & McMillan, 1987). This model for auctions is fundamentally 
different from operations under a fixed-rate format. Addressing each auction property in 
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order, in the market leading Lending Club P2P fixed-rate format lenders are risk neutral 
and select their risk via the loan grade.  Second, the valuation of the loan is conveyed 
through the loan grade and interest rate. Third, borrowers possess symmetric information 
about their own creditworthiness, however the significance of this information is less 
important given 99.26% of loans issued receive their requested funding amount
5
. In other 
words, borrowers that are not rejected via the Lending Club screening process will have 
their loans almost fully funded. This is due to both retail and institutional lender 
investment as well as Lending Club subsidiaries investment in loans. Lastly, the payment 
and interest rates are not a function of the bids and there is a ceiling on the maximum 
amount of investment that can be received.  In P2P fixed-rate lending borrowers no 
longer have the ability to obtain a lower interest rate or gain additional funding through 
persuasive social disclosures. In this environment, the incentives for borrower to use 
social disclosures are minimized and borrowers should not receive substantial economic 
gains from the social disclosures. Counterintuitively, 92.6% of borrowers in the sample 
provided some form of social disclosure.  I posit that social disclosures will actually 
remain significant indicators and strong predictors of loan funding and repayment success 
in fixed-rate formats. I believe that the human element within borrowers causes them to 
provide disclosures even when it is unadvisable or negatively impacts their loans. I also 
believe lenders are not completely rational and are susceptible to compassion filled loan 
descriptions completely unrelated to the borrower’s ability to repay the debt obligation. 
Lastly, I also trust social disclosures minimize asymmetric information between 
borrowers and lenders enabling cognizant lenders to discern and separate good and bad 
                                               
5 92.21% of investment is by ordinary and institutional investors and 7.05% is from Lending Club 
subsidiaries.  
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borrowers. Thus, the first four research questions determine which forms of social 
disclosures are significant under fixed-rate platform parameters. 
Social Disclosure Forms Hypothesis 
The online relationship between capital-seekers and capital-providers is 
significant within P2P fundraising markets and the same is expected within P2P lending 
markets. I test this assumption through dependent variables that measure the Duration of 
time required to fund a loan, the amount of funding received by the borrower, the amount 
of principal recovered by the lender, and whether the loan was fully repaid.  The Duration 
of time required to fully fund a loan is observable by subtracting the loan submission date 
from the loan issue date. The Total Invested variable provides the percentage of the 
borrower’s requested loan amount that was funded, while the Percentage Invested only 
includes funding provided by peers (excludes Lending Club subsidiaries). Lastly, Total 
Recovered Principal measures the percentage of principal returned to lenders and Loan 
Status equal to Fully Paid is tested to determine the ex post influence of social 
disclosures.  
The social disclosures used in this analysis are categorized as either form or 
content disclosures. Beginning with the forms, there are multiple formats information 
about the borrower is expressed to lenders. For example, Lin (2013) and Mollick (2014) 
identify quality signals in the loan descriptions and find that loan descriptions that 
contain typographical errors are less likely to be fully funded by project backers. I posit 
that loan descriptions that contain typographical errors, calculated through the 
Misspellings variable, should also indicate poorer creditworthiness to lenders and will be 
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negatively related to Total Invested, Percent Invested, Total Recovered Principal, and 
Loan Status. P2P lenders all have access to the same information provided by the 
borrower; therefore, accurate high-quality loan descriptions are hypothesized to be more 
attractive to lenders and have a negative relationship with Duration times. Applying the 
same logic, I hypothesize that Word Count and Flesch Index indicate high quality loan 
descriptions that are detailed and well written. These forms of social disclosure will have 
a negative relationship with Duration and positive relationship to Total Invested and 
Percent Invested. I believe the overall presentation of the loan description is meaningful 
to lenders and may influence their investment decision leading to the following 
hypotheses.  
H1: Controlling for objective verifiable information, increasing the different forms of 
social disclosures decreases funding Duration. 
H2: Controlling for objective verifiable information, increasing the different forms of 
social disclosures increases investment from lenders. 
There is a clear distinction between receiving funds and repayment of funds with 
any debt or credit obligation. The same forms of social disclosure positively associated 
with increasing investment are used to evaluate the return of investment. On 
crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter borrower and lender direct interaction takes 
the form of “Updates” and “Comments” in which investors can express enthusiasm or 
displeasure about the loan, product or project. Updates represent efforts by entrepreneurs 
to reach out to current and potential funders in order to inform interested investors about 
developments in a project (Mollick, 2014).  Comments from current and potential 
investors that are answered by entrepreneurs on crowdfunding sites were found to be 
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positively associated with achieving or exceeding funding goals (Mollick, 2014). Mollick 
(2014) also finds that meeting funding goals improves the ability of projects to fulfill 
their obligations to funders on time. Consistent with Mollick (2014), the Updates and 
Questions Answered variables in this study is expected to be an indicator of loan funding 
success as well as repayment success. Borrowers that respond to lender questions are 
expected to be more responsible and creditworthy individuals. These forms of disclosures 
are expected to proxy the relationship banking described in Rajan (1992) and to reduce 
information asymmetries and the likelihood of default. This analysis expects to show 
creditworthy borrowers are engaged and responsive, provide lengthy loan descriptions, 
update their loan listing, respond to lender questions, minimize misspelling errors, and 
post well-written descriptions. These forms of disclosure are expected to positively result 
higher Total Recovered Principal and probability of a Fully Paid loan leading to the 
following hypotheses: 
H3: Controlling for objective verifiable information, increasing the forms of social 
disclosures increases lender Total Recovered Principal.  
H4: Controlling for objective verifiable information, increasing the forms of social 
disclosures increases the probability of loans being Fully Paid. 
Content Analysis Hypothesis 
On a deeper level, understanding the specific content within social disclosures 
from borrowers will also substantially benefit the finance community. Previous research 
drawn from psychology and behavioral economics all demonstrate that voluntary 
unverifiable disclosures influence investing decisions (DellaVigna & Gentzkow, 2009; 
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Michels, 2012; Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981).  These studies also find that investors 
tend to incorporate information that is false or irrelevant into their decision making and 
also overlook conflicts of interest (Cain, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2005; Malmendier & 
Shanthikumar, 2007). Correctly parsing the meaningful content associated with 
creditworthy borrowers is difficult. I hypothesize that discerning investors can use 
specific content provided within social disclosure to predict creditworthiness. Three 
studies, Herzenstein et al. (2011), Lewis (2011), and Michels (2012), establish a 
methodology for delving deeper into the content of social disclosures being provided in 
online markets. Using the same dependent variables described in H1-H4 the relationship 
between specific content and loan performance is evaluated.  
This analysis combines the three separate studies in order to confirm or reject the 
ability of specific content within social disclosures to influence both obtaining funding 
and repaying debt. Beginning with Herzenstein et al. (2011), the article finds that the 
identity claims that increase loan funding are less predictive of loan performance relative 
to other identities. Consistent with Herzenstein (2011), I expect to see identity claims for 
Trustworthy, Successful, Hardworking, Moral, and Religion negatively associated with 
Duration and positively associated with Total Invested and Percent Invested. Building 
upon Lewis (2011), analysis of keyword and qualifier phrases are shown to impact 
investors’ decision making. Keywords such as “Rust” and “Dent” are the most relevant 
factors to automobile buyers and providing qualifying context around these keywords 
increases investment. I hypothesize that keywords and qualifiers may indicate the level of 
attention, focus, and understanding that a borrower possesses regarding debt instruments. 
On the other hand, using keywords may also provide lenders a sense of comfort and 
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security with borrowers that use a common vocabulary and terminology. I expect 
combinations of “credit”, “loan”, and “debt” keywords and their qualifier phrases to have 
an impact on lender investment decisions.  Accordingly, the “credit”, “loan”, and “debt” 
keywords and qualifiers are expected to result in a negative relationship with Duration 
and a positive relationship with Total Invested and Percent Invested.  Lastly, Michels 
(2012) examines social disclosure explanations and their ability to mitigate information 
asymmetries. Monthly expense and interest rate explanations are two forms of 
explanations that indicate the borrower has set forth a measured plan that typically 
includes how the loan will be repaid.  I posit that these types of explanations will also 
have a negative relationship with Duration and positive relationship with Total Invested 
and Percent Invested.  In sum, the content analysis variables produced across the three 
studies lead to the following Duration and Investment hypotheses:   
H5: Controlling for objective verifiable information, increasing the number of identity 
claims, keywords and qualifiers, and borrower explanations within social disclosures 
decreases funding Duration.  
H6: Controlling for objective verifiable information, increasing the number of identity 
claims, keywords and qualifiers, and borrower explanations within social disclosures 
increases funding percentage in terms of Total Invested and Percent Invested by lenders. 
Interestingly, ex post observations of the content analysis variables may produce 
sign changes based on the riskiness of the loan grade. For example, lenders may perceive 
a borrower identity claim for a low risk “A” grade loan to be different from the same 
identity claim on a high-risk “G” grade loan. Identity claims used for grade “A” loans 
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may have less significance to lenders since the hard information, such as credit score, is 
higher.  Specifically, Herzenstein et al. (2011) found higher-risk borrowers use more 
identity claims and the same results are expected in this study. As a result, I expect to see 
Successful and Hardworking identity claims to be positively related to Total Recovered 
Principal and Loan Status since these claims indicate an ability to repay the loan. While 
the Economic Hardship identity claim is expected to carry a negative relationship with 
repayment variables because the borrower is indicating a history of financial 
circumstances that could prevent loan repayment. In terms of keywords and qualifiers, I 
suspect that lower-risk and higher risk borrowers will use keywords in equal proportions. 
Both good and bad borrowers will feel compelled to use the same keywords in their loan 
descriptions to attract investment. Therefore, I posit that keywords and qualifiers will not 
be significant. Based on the Michels (2012) study, I expect educational explanations to 
indicate the borrower’s potential earning potential and ability to repay debt obligations. I 
also expect the monthly expense and interest rate explanations to indicate the borrower’s 
plan for lowering household expenses required to service the loan. For these reasons, I 
expect a positive relationship between the repayment variables and education, monthly 
expense, and interest rate explanations.  Conversely, poor credit and other debt amount 
explanations fail to indicate how the borrower will be reducing expenses to increase 
income and service the debt obligation. As a result, these explanations are expected to 
have a negative relationship with Total Recovered Principal and the Loan Status of Fully 
Paid. Accordingly, I posit that specific content analysis variables will improve loan 
repayment leading to the following hypotheses:    
H7: Controlling for objective verifiable information, increasing the number of Successful 
37 
 
and Hardworking identity claims, Educational, Monthly Expense, and Interest Rate 
explanations within social disclosures increases the Total Recovered Principal. 
H8: Controlling for objective verifiable information, increasing the number of Successful 
and Hardworking identity claims, Educational, Monthly Expense, and Interest Rate 
explanations within social disclosures increases the probability of loans being Fully 
Paid. 
The answers to each of these hypotheses, H1-H8, will indicate the loan 
characteristics that influence lenders to invest and the social disclosures that separate 
good borrowers from bad borrowers. The methodology and test results are provided for 
each hypothesis in the following section.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
Methodology and Results 
 
 
Sample Data 
 
Lending Club is the world’s largest P2P lending company with loan originations 
exceeding $2 billion dollars. The San Francisco, California based firm established in 
2007 host an online lending platform that enables borrowers to obtain a loan, and 
investors to purchase unsecured Notes (fractions of a loan) from borrowers.  In 2011, 
$261 million of loans were originated on the Lending Club platform, and increased 2.75 
times to $718 million in 2012 and to $1.9 billion in 2013. In 2014, the year Lending Club 
became a public company, the firm originated $3.5 billion in loans (Puls, 2015). In order 
to qualify for a loan, a number of factors are considered including but not limited to, the 
information provided on the loan application, information provided about the borrower 
by credit bureaus, borrower credit score, debt-to-income ratio, length of credit history, the 
number of other accounts that the applicant has open, payment history with open 
accounts, and recent credit inquiries. From these inputs, the Lending Club platform either 
rejects or accepts the loan application and subsequently assigns a credit grade, interest 
rate, and creates the loan listing. The loans have a maximum value of $35,000 and 
average loan size of $10,775.29 in my sample.  
The sample was primarily formed from Lending Club publicly available data that 
can be downloaded via a comma separated values (CSV) spreadsheet. However, the 
publicly available data downloads do not contain all of the same information available to 
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lenders during the loan funding window. The data, however, contain a website link to the 
original loan listing. The information lenders are able to review during the sample period 
on the platform is provided in Figure 3 Lending Club Listing. To obtain the exact same 
information available to lenders each of the loan listing’s uniform resource identifier 
(URL) is used to collect the additional information for inclusion with the publicly 
available data set from Lending Club. The resulting data set captures additional social 
disclosure information, Lending Club platform information, and hard credit information. 
The combined URL and CSV data was then filtered to the sample period beginning June 
2007 and ending April 2013. Additional filters were applied to limit the Loan Status to 
only “Fully Paid” or “Charged Off” and the loan term to 36-months. To correct for 
inflation from measurement error, I Winsorize the outliers in the Flesch Index score. The 
Winsorizing process involved setting the negative Flesch Index scores to a value of zero 
(Dixon, 1960). After applying all data filters and parameters the final sample consist of 
31,550 loans with a 36-month terms and a terminal loan status. 
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Figure 3 Lending Club Listing 
  
9/24/13 Credit card refinancing - Lending Club
https://www.lendingclub.com/browse/loanDetail.action?loan_id=7381957&previous=browse 1/2
Account Notes Portfolios Order History Account Activity Bank Account Statements Statistics
Account Profile Sign Out HelpWelcome Robert!
Invest
$8,500
B1
Amount Requested
Loan Purpose Credit card refinancing
Loan Grade
Interest Rate 9.99%
Loan Length 3 years (36 payments)
Monthly Payment $274.24 / month
Under Review Review Status
Funding Received $7,725 (90.88% funded)
Investors 135 people funded this loan
Listing Expires in 13d 9h (10/7/13 3:29 PM)
Loan Status In Funding
Loan Submitted on 9/23/13 3:29 PM
Member_9043865's Profile (all information not verified unless noted with an "*")
Home Ownership OWN
Current Employer n/a
Length of Employment n/a
Gross Income $3,817 / month
Debt-to-Income (DTI) 15.62%
Location HIGHLAND, CA
Member_9043865's Credit History (as reported by credit bureau on 9/23/13)
Credit Score Range: 685-689
Earliest Credit Line 01/2001
Open Credit Lines 8
Total Credit Lines 16
Revolving Credit Balance $12,038.00
Revolving Line Utilization 50.40%
Inquiries in the Last 6 Months 0
Accounts Now Delinquent 0
Delinquent Amount $0.00
Delinquencies (Last 2 yrs) 0
Months Since Last Delinquency n/a
Public Records On File 1
Months Since Last Record 85
Months Since Last Major Derogatory n/a
Loan Description
Questions & Answers
No questions yet.
What is your intended use for the loan proceeds?
What are your current monthly expenses (rent, transportation, utilities, phone, insurance, food, etc)?
What are your monthly expenses related to housing (rent, mortgage(s), home equity loan and / or line of credit, utilities, insurance, taxes, etc)?
If you have a delinquency in the last 2 years, please explain the reason.
Please explain the reason why you carry a large revolving credit balance.
If you have a public record on file, please briefly explain the event and its resolution.
If you are paying a mortgage, please break down all monthly housing related expenses (mortgage payment, insurance, taxes, etc).
If using your loan for multiple purposes, what are the purposes and how are you allocating the money across them?
Please itemize for each of the credit cards you plan to pay off the card name (Visa, MasterCard, etc - Please not include bank issuer of card),
outstanding balance, current interest rate, and current minimum monthly payment.
Borrower Member Loan 7381957 | Lending Club Prospectus
Next »
in Member_9043865
   
Credit card refinancing
Glossary
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Dependent Variables 
 
The chief concern in this study is whether social disclosures influence investment 
and indicate credit worthiness. A lender will only benefit if the social disclosures can be 
reliably used to separate good borrowers from bad borrowers. The methodology is 
designed to test the social disclosures Lenders are able to observe and then produce 
results that indicate if the Funding Amount Invested, Charge Off rate, and Percentage of 
Recovered Principal increases or decreases based on the form of social disclosures and 
content within the social disclosure. That said, the first dependent variable analyzes the 
Duration of time required to fund loans with social disclosures. The Duration variable 
measures the attractiveness of the loan listing based on time required to fund the loan. 
Duration is calculated as the difference between the Loan Submitted Date and Loan Issue 
Date. Duration is calculated in hours to account for the lending platform being open for 
investment twenty-four hours each day. 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = (𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ 24 
The second dependent variable examines the percentage of investment by retail 
and institutional lenders as well as Lending Club subsidiary investment. The dependent 
variable provides an ex ante value that indicates the types of social disclosures that attract 
or deter lenders to invest in a particular loan and is calculated as: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑎𝑚𝑛𝑡
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑎𝑚𝑛𝑡
 
The third dependent variable examines the percentage of investment by only retail 
and institutional lenders in P2P lending platforms between the loan submission date and 
the loan issue date. The dependent variable provides an ex ante value that indicates the 
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types of social disclosures that attract or deter lenders to invest in a particular loan and is 
calculated as: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑎𝑚𝑛𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑣
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑎𝑚𝑛𝑡
 
For the fourth dependent variable, I observe the overall Total Recovered Principal 
returned to the lender.  Total Recovered Principal measures the percentage of principal 
paid by the borrower and is calculated as: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 = ( 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
) 
 
The last area of inquiry is the Loan Status. A Loan Status equal to 1 represents a 
Fully Paid loan and Loan Status equal to 0 represents a Charged Off loan. Loan Status 
measures the social disclosures’ predictive ability in P2P lending as a binary variable. In 
a binary logistic regression, a dependent variable is the probability of the event to occur, 
in this case it is a Loan Status of Full Paid Off fi. To convert this number into a number 
between zero and one, the following transformation is used: 
𝑝𝑖 =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑓𝑖
 
Using a sample of 31,639 Lending Club loans, I propose to test each dependent 
variable in hopes of producing a significant contribution in the field of finance. A 
summary of the aforementioned variables are provided in Table 2 Dependent Variables. 
  
43 
 
Table 2 Dependent Variables 
P2P Dependent 
Variables 
Abbreviation Variable Description 
Duration duration Calculation of the Note Submitted on 
Date minus the Loan Issued on Date to 
derive duration measured in hours. 
Total Invested tot_inv (%) The total amount invested by both retail 
and institutional investors as well as 
Lending Club subsidiaries 
Percent Invested pct_inv (%) The total amount committed by only 
retail and institutional investors for the 
loan expressed as a percentage of the 
funded amount. 
Total Recovered 
Principal  
pct_rec_prncp (%) The total amount funded by lenders 
divided by the recovered principal 
amount. This is a continuous variable 
from 0% to 100%. 
Loan Status loan_status Current status of the loan. This is a 
dummy variable that is assigned Fully 
paid = 1, Charged off = 0 
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Social Disclosure Forms Independent Variables 
Analysis of the different types of social disclosures provided in this study is used 
to understand if the presentation of the social disclosure information is a significant 
predictor in P2P lending markets. The first variable measured is the loan description 
Word Count determined by using a formula that calculates the number of words in the 
description based on the count spaces and length of the text within the loan description. 
This number is then subtracted from the length of the text with spaces to calculate the 
number of words in the description result.  A count of Questions Answered (QA) and 
Updates are performed as a proxy for social disclosures. The QA captured from each loan 
listing webpage are denoted with a “Q:” for question or an “A:” for answer. A count of 
records with “A:” responses are counted for each loan to determine the number of 
questions the borrower answered related to their loan request. In a similar fashion, 
Updates to the loan description provided by the borrower are denoted by “borrower 
added on:” with an appended date. Each borrower Update is totaled for hypothesis testing 
and analysis. Lastly, I include two quality measures by incorporating Misspellings and 
the Flesch Index variables that capture whether the social disclosure conforms to the 
standard English grammar and punctuation rules. The Misspelling variable is calculated 
using Andrew Golding and Dan Roth's "Winnow-based spelling correction algorithm," 
published in 1999, which is able to recognize about 96% of context-sensitive spelling 
errors, in addition to ordinary non-word spelling errors. The Flesch Index reading score 
indicates how difficult a passage in English is to understand. Higher scores indicate 
material that is easier to read, while lower scores are more difficult to read. Use of this 
scale is included in word processing programs and services such as Microsoft Office 
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Word, WordPerfect, and WordPro. The next group of variables relate to the qualitative 
content analysis. 
Content Analysis Independent Variables 
This study recreates the scoring approach used in Herzenstein et al. (2011), Lewis 
(2011), and Michels (2012), for content analysis that captures personal identity claims, 
keyword qualifiers, and credit explanations to assess social disclosures.  Beginning with 
Herzenstein et al. (2011), I measure the number of personal identity claims related to 
trustworthiness, personal success, economic hardship, work ethic, morality, and religion 
within a social disclosure. Identity claims are scored each time borrower references 
keywords related to trustworthiness, personal success, economic hardship, work ethic, 
morality, or religion. To develop this list of keywords related to each identity claim type 
the Merriam-Webster Thesaurus of synonyms and related words are included for each 
identity claim. A calculation is then used to sum the number of identity claims found in 
the identity claim results column. Herzenstein et al. (2011) with the assistance of 10 
research assistants also coded demographic information on the Prosper Lending platform 
using both narratives and the borrower’s picture. Note, based on my review of loan 
descriptions the majority of the demographic information related to race and gender was 
most likely based on the picture provided by the borrower. However, profile pictures are 
not allowed on Lending Club. Due to this difference in platforms, I have excluded the 
race demographic information in the data set and in the regression results. 
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Table 3 Identity Claim Examples 
Identity Claim Criteria Example 
Trustworthy – Lenders can 
trust the borrower to pay back 
the loan on time. 
Loan ID 3153865 added on 01/16/13: “I've 
accumulated this debt after 3 years or rough times and 
need to pay it off the right way. I'm a very reliable and 
responsible person. I have done my calculations and 
Lending Club would help me save on the interests that 
are charged on my credit cards by far! My goal is to 
start fresh w/ no debt.” 
 
Successful – The borrower is 
someone with a successful 
business, job, or career. 
Loan ID 607833 added on 11/01/10:  “The recession 
hit me hard as I graduated from grad school with a lot 
of student loans and a difficult job market. Since then, 
I've found a great, stable job where I am flourishing. 
I've been diligently paying off my school loan 
payments and chiseling away at my credit card debt, 
but my credit card company has raised rates to a 
ridiculous level. I would be a great borrower--I'm 
responsible, I have a great credit score and pay all of 
my bills on time. This debt is weighing heavily on me, 
and I'm looking for a little help now to get some peace 
of mind, and I hope to pay it forward to others in the 
future.” 
 
Economic Hardship – The 
borrower is someone in need 
because of hardship, as a 
result of difficult 
circumstances, bad luck, or 
other misfortunes that were or 
were not, under the 
borrower’s control. 
Loan ID 2091941 added on 11/18/12: “Hurricane 
Sandy property repairs Borrower added on 11/18/12: 
Pay for significant Hurricane Sandy damages incurred 
by my home and vehicle. This tragedy hit my family 
very hard. I have a great track record of paying back 
my loans in full, on time. I have a very stable job as a 
software engineer at a prominent financial services 
company with a strong salary.” 
 
Hardworking - The borrower 
will work very hard to pay 
back the loan back. 
Loan ID 4308544 added on 04/13/13: “This loan will 
be used pay pay off credit card debt. I am responsbile 
and my employment is very stable. I have worked in 
the same industry for 30 years and with my current 
employeer for 6 years. I'm hard working, reliable and 
look forward to being debit free in less than 3 years! 
Thank you.” 
 
Moral – the borrower is an 
honest or moral person. 
Loan ID 828449 added on 07/24/11: “I request this 
loan to pay off credit cards, currently charging me over 
24%APR. My current job is stable and very rewarding. 
This loan will provide the relief I so much need and 
help me deal with my debt situation, leaving me in a 
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Identity Claim Criteria Example 
better position to quickly pay off my loan. I've been 
dealing with this debt burden for too long and I pride 
my credit worthiness and moral credibility.” 
 
Religious – the borrower is a 
religious person. 
Loan ID 668663 added on 02/06/11: “Loan to go to 
Italy on vacation and for a Spiritual Break - I am an 
Episcopal Priest who works at a parish and helps to run 
a homeless shelter...do not get to take much time away 
as my mother lives with me and I have to hire a nurse 
when I do get to travel. Blessings!” 
Note: Multiple identity claims can exist in a single loan description and each is scored. 
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Next, the data is filtered to nouns most frequently used (for example “credit” had 
a frequency of 1833, compared to 33 for “market”). The top 3 keywords “Credit”, 
“Loan”, and “Debt” were selected from this list to be the variables that interact with 
qualifier words. The Top 100 nouns used are provided in the table below. Note, “Will”, 
“Still”, “Back”, “Few”, “Most”, “May”, “Part”, “Lot”, “Put”, and “Use” are within the 
top 100 most frequently used nouns but were removed because they were reasonably 
assumed to be used as verbs within the context of P2P lending.  
Third, I analyze concordance for each word chosen, by observing how it was used 
in context, by examining a list of qualifying phrases surrounding each word. A list of 
keywords words and qualifiers were derived from the corpus and Merriam-Webster 
thesaurus of related words. For example, for negations, I used “no”, “not”, “never”, 
“nothing”, “free” (as in “debt free”), “zero”; for adjectives, I used “small”, “minor”, etc.  
Fourth, I search for each of the three nouns (“Credit”, “Loan”, and “Debt”) and 
where they were found, I perform a secondary search for any of the qualifiers within 50 
characters of the noun. I perform multiple calculations to pair keywords and qualifiers 
and then score them appropriately as dummy variables Credit Combination, Loan 
Combination, and Debt Combination. I then score each row of data to determine the 
count of Credit references with No Credit, Less Credit, and Credit if no qualifiers are 
present. I repeat this process for Loan and Debt keywords in order to produce three 
dummy variables to capture Credit Combination, Loan Combination, and Debt 
Combinations of keywords and qualifiers. 
 
  
49 
 
Table 4 Loan Description Noun Frequency 
Top 100 Nouns Used in Loan Descriptions Frequency Table (n=2,000) 
credit 1833 income 216 bank 104 wedding 67 process 40 
loan 1715 stable 216 save 104 term 63 saving 40 
debt 1045 company 190 life 103 secure 62 employer 39 
card 790 business 181 family 99 living 61 care 38 
interest 688 balance 180 rent 94 cost 59 couple 38 
payment 636 current 177 wife 92 future 57 date 38 
one 449 two 173 total 90 close 56 salary 38 
time 447 thanks 157 way 90 end 56 single 37 
job 429 well 147 start 88 opportunity 55 state 37 
rate 402 club 141 cash 83 vehicle 53 capital 36 
money 368 great 140 insurance 81 investment 52 finance 36 
month 358 purchase 136 order 79 property 52 people 36 
help 341 house 133 account 75 right 52 industry 35 
high 331 full 123 cover 74 buy 51 project 35 
need 319 amount 121 bill 72 purpose 51 support 35 
home 304 score 121 goal 71 hope 48 request 34 
good 264 school 118 move 71 employment 47 second 34 
work 234 budget 115 low 70 love 42 gas 33 
year 230 college 107 position 68 day 41 market 33 
car 226 history 107 student 68 place 40 phone 33 
Notes: The TextStat tool analysis of word frequency was cross-referenced against a 
dictionary of English nouns to develop a corpus of words based on a random sample of 
2,000 loan descriptions. 
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Table 5 Keyword and Qualifier Examples 
Qualifier Criteria Example 
X – no qualifier phrases used in the 50 
characters preceding keywords Credit, 
Loan, and Debt 
Loan ID 4277144 added on 04/11/13: 
“Refinancing Credit Cards” 
No X – negation phrases used in the 50 
characters preceding keywords Credit, 
Loan, and Debt 
Loan ID 3290065 added on 01/31/13: “Never 
been late a single day and even without the 
loan …” 
Less X – minimization phrases used in 
the 50 characters preceding keywords 
Credit, Loan, and Debt 
Loan ID 4300149 added on 04/15/13: “This 
loan is for debt consolidation. I have a few 
small balance loans/ credit cards …” 
Note: Multiple keywords and qualifiers can exist in a single loan description. Each 
type of qualifier criteria is only scored once per loan description. 
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The last content analysis approach adopted is from Michels (2012). Michels 
(2012) measures purpose of the loan, income amount, income source, education, amount 
of other debt, interest rate on other debt, explanation for poor credit grade, listing of 
monthly expenses, and a picture of a person (presumably the borrower) using the Prosper 
Lending platform. Lending Club provides the purpose of the loan, income amount, 
income source, and does not allow borrowers to provide a picture. The remaining 
variables applicable to by Lending Club are explanations related to education, poor 
credit, borrower’s monthly expenses, other debt rate, and the amount of other expenses. 
This subset of explanation variables are scored in this analysis. A key difference between 
Michels (2012) and my study are the number of loans being reviewed. I have 31,639 
records compared to the sample of 500 records used in Michels (2012). In order to 
identify the records that have Education, Poor Credit, Monthly Expenses, Other Debt 
Rate, and Amount of Debt explanation. I use an algorithm to search each loan 
explanation type for the keywords associated with Education, Poor Credit, Monthly 
Expenses, Other Debt Rate, and Amount of Debt explanations. The algorithm identified 
10,661 records that were reviewed and manually coded. Results were coded in the same 
manner as Michels (2012) where one (1) point is assigned for each explanation disclosed. 
The following criteria and corpus were used for manually coding the data. 
  
52 
 
Table 6 Credit Explanation Scoring Examples 
Explanation Criteria Example 
Education - borrower indicates 
they successfully completed an 
Education Program. 
Loan ID 2378969 added on 12/08/12: “I am seeking 
this loan to get myself out of credit card debt's high 
interest rates. I am a college graduate and I work 
very hard to get ahead in life. I volunteer in my 
community in my spare time as a way of giving 
back. I hope I can help your investments while you 
help me wipe out debt!” 
Poor Credit - borrower explains 
why his or her credit grade is 
low. 
Loan ID 2381074 added on 12/10/12: “After 
graduating college I unfortunately became a victim 
to a debt consolidation scam. They were supposed to 
pay my bills while I paid them. They did not make 
those payments. I have worked the last 5 years to get 
my credit back. This situation has caused so many 
credit problems for me. Thank you.” 
Monthly Expenses - borrower 
lists their monthly expenses. 
Loan ID 3153832 added on 01/16/13: “Budget-Rent-
$1,825.00, Utilities and Internet-$368.00, Food-
$500.00. No transportation cost. Have been with 
company for six years, in current position for two.” 
Interest Rate on Other Debt - 
the listing reports the interest 
rate on at least one of the 
borrower’s other debts. 
Loan ID 3642613 added on 03/06/13: “A credit card 
account is charging me 23.99% - i'm just trying to 
reduce my interest rate to make faster progress in 
paying off my debt.” 
Amount of Other Debt - the 
borrower reports outstanding 
balances of other debt. 
Loan ID 3373085 added on 03/12/13: “want to pay 
off two credit cards. one has had about a $6000 
balance for a few years now. just seem like i am not 
making a dent. the other card is under $1800, that 
was mostly from buying home heating oil this 
winter. just want to pay them both off and keep the 
one for emergencies. thank you..” 
Notes: Multiple explanations can be used in the same loan description. Each type of 
explanation is only scored once per loan description.  
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The independent variables used in this study were produced from a variety of 
sources to create a unique data set. Algorithms for Word Count, Updates, Questions 
Answered, and Flesch Index were designed as well as manual scoring of each loan 
description. The manual scoring required for the content analysis was performed by three 
research assistants and then revised by one of the lead research assistant to ensure 
consistency in the methodology. The complete list of independent variables represented 
in the study is provided in Table 7 Independent Variables below: 
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Table 7 Independent Variables 
Variable Abbreviation Variable Description 
Word Count word_count Word Count is based on the number of words in 
the Loan Description and calculated using a 
word parsing formula. 
Updates  updates  Updates to the loan descriptions during the 
funding window occurs when the borrower 
appends additional information to the loan 
description originally provided.  
Questions 
Answered 
qa_total The count of the lenders questions answered 
during the funding window. 
Misspellings misspellings Misspellings are based on the number of 
Misspellings in the Loan Description and 
calculated using Andrew Golding and Dan 
Roth's Winnow-based spelling correction 
algorithm. 
Flesch Index flesch_index The Flesch Index readability score uses the 
sentence length (number of words per sentence) 
and the number of syllables per word in an 
equation to calculate the reading ease. Texts 
with a very high Flesch Index reading ease 
score (about 100) are very easy to read.  
Trustworthy trustworthy Borrower indicated they are Trustworthy then 
the dummy variable takes the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
Successful successful Borrower indicated they are Successful then the 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
Economic 
Hardship 
economic_ 
hardship 
Borrower indicated they are Economic 
Hardship then the dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Hardworking hardworking Borrower indicated they are Hardworking then 
the dummy variable takes the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
Moral moral Borrower indicated they are Moral then the 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
Religious religious Borrower indicated they are Religious then the 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
Credit 
Combination 
 credit_combo The keyword "Credit" was provided in the loan 
description without qualifiers preceding the 
keyword, or the keyword "Credit" was provided 
in the loan description with negation qualifiers 
preceding the keyword, or the keyword "Credit" 
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Variable Abbreviation Variable Description 
was provided in the loan description with 
minimizing qualifiers preceding the keyword. 
Loan 
Combination 
loan_combo The keyword "Loan" was provided in the loan 
description without qualifiers preceding the 
keyword, or the keyword "Loan" was provided 
in the loan description with negation qualifiers 
preceding the keyword, or the keyword "Loan" 
was provided in the loan description with 
minimizing qualifiers preceding the keyword. 
Debt 
Combination 
debt_combo The keyword "Debt" was provided in the loan 
description without qualifiers preceding the 
keyword, or the keyword "Debt" was provided 
in the loan description with negation qualifiers 
preceding the keyword, or the keyword "Debt" 
was provided in the loan description with 
minimizing qualifiers preceding the keyword. 
Education 
Explanation 
education  A 1 is coded when the borrower indicates they 
successfully completed an education program, 0 
otherwise. 
Explanation of 
Poor Credit 
poor credit A 1 is coded when the borrower explains the 
life circumstances that the led to the Poor 
Credit. 
Monthly 
Expenses 
Explanation 
monthly 
expenses  
A point is awarded when the borrower provides 
the dollar value of at least one Monthly 
Expense, 0 otherwise. 
Other Debt Rate 
Explanation 
other debt rate  A point is awarded when the borrower states the 
numerical Interest rate on their Other Debts 
Amount of Other 
Debt 
amount of 
other debt 
A 1 is coded when the borrower provides the 
dollar value of an existing Amount of Other 
Debt owed, 0 otherwise. 
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Control Variables 
The control variables include both endogenous and exogenous factors to control 
for platform determined, loan application, and market variables. Within the platform-
determined variables, I control for the Verification Status, which contains three states: 
Income Verified, Income Source Verified and Not Verified.  The Lending Club platform 
can request the borrower verify income, the income source, or both income and income 
source, but do not indicate in the publicly available data when both income and income 
source are verified. For these reasons, I use a higher level of abstraction and convert 
Verification Status to a binary variable for either Verified or Not Verified coded as 0 or 1 
respectively. Within the loan application variables, Loan Purpose comprises 14 variables 
that are standardized for borrowers to select from when completing the loan application. 
The 14 available Loan Purposes include car, credit card, debt consolidation, educational, 
home improvement, house, major purchase, medical, moving, other, renewable energy, 
small business, vacation, and wedding loans. Note the “Other” loan purpose category is 
made the reference variable in this analysis. 
The first of the loan application variables is the Funded Amount Requested. The 
Funded Amount Requested is total amount of money requested by the borrower and has 
been converted to a log value with base 10 in the analysis. This list of Loan Purposes has 
been converted into dummy variables taking the value of 0 or 1. The next set of loan 
application variables are verifiable through third-party service providers and Lending 
Club verification mechanisms for the borrower’s FICO Score, Debt-to-Income (DTI) 
ratio, Home Ownership, Revolving Credit Line Utilization, and Monthly Income. All of 
these variables were found to be significant in Emekter et al. (2015). Consistent with 
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Emekter et al. (2015) the annual income was converted to Monthly Income by dividing 
the annual income by 12 months. I then take the log of the Monthly Income for 
consistency across the study.  
The last set of control variables represents market factors that are present during 
the study. The Loan Volume variable controls for the daily number of loans issued on the 
platform within a 24-hour period. The Credit Spread variable is the platform assigned 
interest rate minus the 2-year Treasury rate. The Credit Spread variable enables the study 
to control for the market interest rate changes over time. I also control for economic 
sentiment changes throughout the year that can be measured monthly using the Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Report. The loan issue date and Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Report for the corresponding month control for periods with better economic sentiment 
that historically result in higher rates of default. The Dorfleitner (2016) article introduces 
the January effect (Turn Year) concept for P2P credit markets and suggest that periods 
with better economic sentiment predict a higher probability of default. This observation is 
limited to loans in the January time window and are extended across the entire calendar 
year in this study. The Log of Per Capita Wages is also included as a control variable and 
is based on the three-digit zip code prefix provided in the Lending Club data. The three-
digit zip code prefix s used to determine the borrower’s city in order to calculate the 
city’s population and divide the population by the total aggregated wages for that city 
based on 2012 Census data. In Table 8 Control Variables a summarized list of variables is 
provided. 
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Table 8 Control Variables 
 
Control Variables Abbreviation Variable Description 
Verification Status verified_status  Indicates if income was verified 
by Lending Club, not verified, or 
if the income source was verified. 
The verification status was 
converted to a binary variable 
where 0=Verified and 1 = Not 
verified 
Car car Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for a car. The 
dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Credit Card credit_card Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for a credit card. 
The dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Debt Consolidation debt_consolidation Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for a debt 
consolidation. The dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 and 
0 otherwise. 
Educational educational Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for an educational. 
The dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Home Improvement home_improvement Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for a home 
improvement. The dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 and 
0 otherwise. 
House house Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for a house. The 
dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Major Purchase major_purchase Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for a major 
purchase. The dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
Medical medical Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for a medical. The 
dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Moving moving Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for a moving. The 
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Control Variables Abbreviation Variable Description 
dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Other (reference) other (reference) Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for “other” 
(reference). The variable is 
excluded as a reference variable. 
Renewable Energy renewable_energy Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for a renewable 
energy. The dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
Small Business small_business Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for a small business. 
The dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Vacation vacation Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for a vacation. The 
dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Wedding wedding Borrower indicated the purpose 
of the loan is for a wedding. The 
dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Log Funded Amount 
Requested 
log_amount_requested The total amount requested by the 
borrower converted to a log with 
base 10. 
FICO Score FICO_avg Borrower’s credit score is 
calculated as the average between 
the high and low FICO score.  
Debt-to-Income (DTI) dti A ratio calculated using the 
borrower’s total monthly debt 
payments on the total debt 
obligations, excluding mortgage 
and the requested Lending Club 
loan, divided by the borrower’s 
self-reported monthly income. 
Home Ownership home_own The home ownership status 
provided by the borrower during 
registration and has been 
converted to a binary variable for 
0=Ownership and 1=Rent. 
Married married Borrower indicated they are 
Married then the dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
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Control Variables Abbreviation Variable Description 
Divorced divorced Borrower indicated they are 
Divorced then the dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 and 
0 otherwise. 
Single single Borrower indicated they are 
Single then the dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
Engaged engaged Borrower indicated they are 
Engaged then the dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 and 
0 otherwise. 
   
Children children Borrower indicated they are 
Children then the dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 and 
0 otherwise. 
Revolving Line Utilization revol_util Revolving line utilization rate is 
the amount of credit the borrower 
is using relative to all available 
revolving credit. 
Log Monthly Income mthly_inc_log($) The annual income provided by 
the borrower during registration 
has been converted to monthly 
income (gross income/12 months) 
with log base 10. 
Log Loan Volume loan_vol_log The daily volume of new loans on 
the platform determined by the 
issue date. Converted to log base 
10. 
Credit Spread credit_spread (%) Provides the loan interest rate 
minus the Federal Reserve 2 year 
Treasury Bonds interest rate. 
Consumer Sentiment consumer_sentiment  Provides Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Report data 
corresponding to the issue date 
month of the loan. 
Log Per Capita Wages log_per_capita_wage Based on the three-digit zip code 
prefix provided in the Lending 
Club data the borrower city 
population is divided by the total 
aggregated wages for that city 
based on 2012 Census data. 
Converted to a log base 10. 
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The descriptive statistics from the sample is provided in Tables 10, 11, and 12. 
The descriptive statistics have also been constructed to provide both the high–level 
analysis of the data, but also to demonstrate the difference between loans listed with 
social disclosures and without social disclosures present. Beginning with the total loan 
amount funded equals $340,919,425 between the periods of June 1, 2007 to April 1, 
2013. These loans all have a loan status of either Charged Off or Fully Paid. From this 
total $51,570,350 of the loans were Charged Off and $289,349,075 of the loans were 
Fully Paid. At the highest level of aggregation this equals 84.9% of loans issued within 
the sample period were Fully Paid and 15.1% were Charged Off.  
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Table 9 Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
duration (hrs) 198.63 177.10 106.01 6.75 774.92 
tot_inv(%) 99.26% 100.00% 5.47% 10.25% 100.00% 
pct_inv (%) 92.21% 100.00% 21.37% 0.00% 100.00% 
pct_rec_prncp(%) 89.83% 100.00% 24.70% 0.00% 100.00% 
loan_status 0.85 1.00 0.355 0 1 
N 31,550  31,550  31,550  31,550  31,550  
Notes: Table 9 describes the dependent variables used in the analysis for sample period of June 2007 to 
April 2013. Duration is a continuous variable based on the number of hours between the loan submission 
and loan issue date and time. The total_inv (%), pct_inv (%), and pct_rec_prncp (%) are continuous 
variables expressed as percentages. The loan status is a binary variable equaling 1 for Fully Paid and 0 for 
Charged Off loans. The lack of variation in the Median and Maximum statistics is a result of loans receiving 
an average of 99.26% of the requested loan amount and Lending Club policies that prevent loans receiving 
funding in excess of 100% of the requested amount. 
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Table 10 Independent Variables Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
word_count 61.10 39.00 71.812 0 1056 
updates 0.97 1.00 0.863 0 28 
qa_total 1.35 1.00 1.784 0 15 
misspellings 0.56 0.00 1.540 0 37 
flesch_index 64.9 65.71 17.99 0 160.48 
trustworthy 0.22 0.00 0.414 0 1 
successful 0.03 0.00 0.158 0 1 
economic_hardship 0.05 0.00 0.220 0 1 
hardworking 0.32 0.00 0.465 0 1 
moral 0.17 0.00 0.372 0 1 
religious 0.00 0.00 0.050 0 1 
credit_combo 0.54 1.00 0.498 0 1 
loan_combo 0.51 1.00 0.500 0 1 
debt_combo 0.38 0.00 0.485 0 1 
edu_exp 0.03 0.00 0.157 0 1 
poor_credit_exp 0.01 0.00 0.087 0 1 
mthly_expense_exp 0.03 0.00 0.180 0 1 
oth_rate_exp 0.07 0.00 0.253 0 1 
amnt_oth_debt_exp 0.02 0.00 0.153 0 1 
N 31,550  31,550  31,550  31,550  31,550  
Notes: Table 10 describes the independent variables used in the analysis for the sample period June 2007 to 
April 2013. The word_count is the total number of words used in the loan description. Updates is the count 
of revisions to the loan description. The qa_total is the count of borrower answers to lender questions. 
Misspellings are the number of grammatical errors identified. The flesch_index variable is a calculated 
readability score. A reference to trustworthy, successful, economic_hardship hardworking, moral, and 
religious is scored 1 if present and 0 otherwise. Credit, loan, and debt keywords and phrases are scored using 
credit_combo, loan_combo, or debt_combo variables with a 1 if present and 0 otherwise. Borrower 
explanations for education experience, poor credit, monthly expenses, other interest rates, and amount of 
other debt, are scored using edu_exp, poor_credit_exp, mthly_expense_exp, oth_rate_exp, and 
amnt_oth_debt_exp with a 1 if present and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 11 Control Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
verified_status 0.51 1.00 0.500 0 1 
car 0.02 0.00 0.156 0 1 
credit_card 0.17 0.00 0.372 0 1 
debt_consolidation 0.50 1.00 0.500 0 1 
educational 0.01 0.00 0.108 0 1 
home_improvement 0.06 0.00 0.240 0 1 
house 0.01 0.00 0.096 0 1 
major_purchase 0.04 0.00 0.204 0 1 
medical 0.01 0.00 0.120 0 1 
moving 0.01 0.00 0.109 0 1 
other (reference) 0.09 0.00 0.284 0 1 
renewable_energy 0.00 0.00 0.045 0 1 
small_business 0.04 0.00 0.191 0 1 
vacation 0.01 0.00 0.087 0 1 
wedding 0.02 0.00 0.137 0 1 
loan_amount_req_log 3.94 4.00 0.30 2.70 4.54 
FICO_avg 709.49 702.00 35.67 612.00 847.50 
dti 14.30 14.19 7.29 0.00 34.96 
home_own 0.48 0.00 0.500 0 1 
married 0.06 0.00 0.234 0 1 
divorced 0.01 0.00 0.080 0 1 
single 0.02 0.00 0.140 0 1 
engaged 0.00 0.00 0.042 0 1 
children 0.16 0.00 0.366 0 1 
revol_util(%) 51.13% 52.90% 27.38% 0.00% 119.00% 
mthly_inc_log 3.69 3.70 0.25 0.00 5.77 
loan_vol_log 1.58 1.54 0.39 0.00 2.58 
credit_spread 11.20% 11.09% 3.54% 2.15% 24.64% 
consumer_sentiment 71.25 72.90 6.93 55.30 90.40 
per_capita_wage_log 4.39 4.38 0.11 4.00 5.06 
N 31,550  31,550  31,550  31,550  31,550  
Notes: Table 11 describes the control variables used in the analysis for the sample period June 2007 to April 
2013. Dummy variables are used for the verified_status, car, credit_card, debt_consolidation, educational, 
home_improvement, house, major_purchase, medical, moving, other (reference), renewable_energy, 
small_business, vacation, wedding loan characteristics. The loan_amount_req_log is a log (Base 10) of the 
funding amount requested. FICO_avg is the average of a borrower high and low FICO score. Debt-to-
income (DTI) is the ratio provided in the Lending Club dataset. Borrower demographic information is 
captured with dummy variables for home_own, married, divorced, single, engaged, and children. The 
revol_util variables captures the amount of revolving credit being used across all borrower accounts.  The 
mthly_inc_log captures the log (Base 10) value of the borrower’s monthly salary. The loan_vol_log captures 
the log (Base 10) volume of loans submitted on the Lending Club platform daily. The credit spread is the 
Lending Club provided interest rate minus the 2-yr treasury bond interest rate. The per_capita_wage_log 
captures the log (Base 10) per capita wages based on the 3-digit zip code of the borrower’s home address. 
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Panel A of Table 12 demonstrates that $316,001,850 (92.7%) contained social 
disclosures and the remaining $24,917,575 (7.3%) did not contain social disclosures. The 
percentage of loans Charged Off with social disclosures is 14.9%, which is moderately 
below the sample average of 15.1%. However, for non-disclosure loans the Charge Off 
rate is 17.9%, which is 2.75% percentage points higher than the overall sample. the non-
disclosure loans Charge Off rate slightly improves to 16.9%, however the overall 
percentage of loans issued that are ultimately Charged Off is lower at 14.8%. When 
observing the same break-down as a count in Table 14 Count of Disclosures and Funded 
Amount by Grade, the non-disclosure loans Charge Off rate slightly improves to 16.9%, 
however the overall percentage of loans issued that are ultimately Charged Off is lower at 
14.8%. At first glance, the descriptive statistics indicate that there is a difference between 
loans that provide social disclosures and Charged Off loans have a higher dollar value on 
average. Table 12 and Table 13 also demonstrate the majority of loans issued on the 
platform are of the A, B, and C grade variety. Within each of the grades the Fully Paid 
versus Charged Off percentages do not deviate significantly between Charged Off and 
Fully Paid loans with the exception of E and F grades of non-disclosure loans which 
outperform social disclosure loans of the same grade. Within the E grade of stratification 
19.5% of non-disclosure loans are Charged Off compared to E grade social disclosure 
loans 25.5% Charge Off rate. Similar results exist for F grade non-disclosure loans 
Charge Off rate of 25.6% while social disclosure F grade loans are Charged Off at 32.8%. 
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Table 12 Value of Disclosures and Funded Amount by Grade 
Grade Charged Off ($) % Fully Paid ($) % Total ($) % 
Panel A: SD $47,105,325 14.9% $268,896,525 85.1% $316,001,850 92.7% 
A $4,876,900 6.3% $72,505,800 93.7% $77,382,700 22.7% 
B $14,311,950 12.9% $96,248,975 87.1% $110,560,925 32.4% 
C $12,647,200 18.6% $55,391,875 81.4% $68,039,075 20.0% 
D $9,581,675 23.8% $30,664,750 76.2% $40,246,425 11.8% 
E $3,409,150 25.8% $9,808,025 74.2% $13,217,175 3.9% 
F $1,480,850 34.7% $2,784,900 65.3% $4,265,750 1.3% 
G $797,600 34.8% $1,492,200 65.2% $2,289,800 0.7% 
Panel B: ND $4,465,025 17.9% $20,452,550 82.1% $24,917,575 7.3% 
A $251,975 5.1% $4,737,050 94.9% $4,989,025 1.5% 
B $1,467,275 16.9% $7,196,750 83.1% $8,664,025 2.5%6 
C $1,319,575 22.7% $4,495,950 77.3% $5,815,525 1.7% 
D $985,250 27.4% $2,605,975 72.6% $3,591,225 1.1% 
E $224,225 17.8% $1,036,725 82.2% $1,260,950 0.4% 
F $104,900 29.4% $251,700 70.6% $356,600 0.1% 
G $111,825 46.6% $128,400 53.4% $240,225 0.1% 
Total $51,570,350 15.1% $289,349,075 84.9% $340,919,425 100.0% 
Notes: Table 12 Panel A describes loans categorized with Social Disclosure (SD) and Panel B Non-
disclosure (ND) represents loans with fewer than 10 words in the loan description. The number of 
words was set to 10 to offset date and time text automatically appended to the beginning of each loan 
description by the Lending Club platform. The total dollar value and percentage of loans Charged Off 
and Fully Paid is provided at both the panel level and expressed as an overall total. 
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Table 13 Count of Disclosures and Funded Amount by Grade  
Grade Charged Off  % Fully Paid % Total % 
Panel B: SD 4273 14.6% 24955 85.4% 29228 92.4% 
A 495 6.3% 7325 93.7% 7820 24.7% 
B 1277 13.0% 8531 87.0% 9808 31.0% 
C 1177 18.5% 5184 81.5% 6361 20.1% 
D 865 24.0% 2733 76.0% 3598 11.4% 
E 286 25.5% 835 74.5% 1121 3.5% 
F 111 32.8% 227 67.2% 338 1.1% 
G 62 34.1% 120 65.9% 182 0.6% 
Panel A: ND 408 16.9% 2003 83.1% 2411 7.6% 
A 32 6.2% 483 93.8% 515 1.6% 
B 135 16.7% 673 83.3% 808 2.6% 
C 112 19.9% 450 80.1% 562 1.8% 
D 86 25.2% 255 74.8% 341 1.1% 
E 24 19.5% 99 80.5% 123 0.4% 
F 10 25.6% 29 74.4% 39 0.1% 
G 9 39.1% 14 60.9% 23 0.1% 
Total 4681 14.8% 26958 85.2% 31639 100.0% 
Notes: Table 13 Panel A describes loans categorized with Social Disclosure (SD) and Panel B Non-
disclosure (ND) represents loans with fewer than 10 words in the loan description. The number of 
words was set to 10 to offset date and time text automatically appended to the beginning of each 
loan description by the Lending Club platform. The total count and percentage of loans Charged Off 
and Fully Paid is provided at both the panel level and expressed as an overall total. 
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Moving on to Table 15 and Table 16, that data demonstrates that credit card and 
debt consolidation are overwhelmingly the most listed purpose for using the Lending 
Club platform representing 66.7% of all loans issued in the sample. Again, non-
disclosure loans have higher rates of being Charged Off in every category except 
Educational loans where 21.7% of social disclosure loans are Charged Off relative to 
15.4% of non-disclosure loans. For both social disclosure and non-disclosure Small 
Business loans are the riskiest loan issued with over 27% of the loans being Charged Off. 
Furthermore, Small Business loans represent 4.4% of the total loan value funded but 
represent 8.4% of the Charged Off loan value.   
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Table 14 Count of Disclosures and Funded Amount by Loan Purpose 
Loan Purpose Charged Off % Fully Paid % Total % 
Panel A: SD   4,273  14.6%  24,955  85.4%  29,228  92.4% 
Car  70  9.6%  662  90.4%  732  2.3% 
Credit card  590  12.1%  4,276  87.9%  4,866  15.4% 
Debt Consolidation  2,190  14.9%  12,490  85.1%  14,680  46.4% 
Home Improvement  237  13.3%  1,550  86.7%  1,787  5.6% 
House  39  14.4%  232  85.6%  271  0.9% 
Major Purchase  118  9.2%  1,168  90.8%  1,286  4.1% 
Medical  82  19.2%  344  80.8%  426  1.3% 
Moving  52  14.5%  306  85.5%  358  1.1% 
Other  416  16.4%  2,125  83.6%  2,541  8.0% 
Renewable Energy  10  17.2%  48  82.8%  58  0.2% 
Small Business  298  27.0%  804  73.0%  1,102  3.5% 
Vacation  34  14.8%  195  85.2%  229  0.7% 
Wedding  65  11.6%  495  88.4%  560  1.8% 
Educational  72  21.7%  260  78.3%  332  1.0% 
Panel B: ND  408  16.9%  2,003  83.1%  2,411  7.6% 
Car  6  10.7%  50  89.3%  56  0.2% 
Credit card  60  15.4%  330  84.6%  390  1.2% 
Debt Consolidation  198  16.8%  979  83.2%  1,177  3.7% 
Home Improvement  25  15.3%  138  84.7%  163  0.5% 
House  2  9.5%  19  90.5%  21  0.1% 
Major Purchase  14  14.6%  82  85.4%  96  0.3% 
Medical  6  16.7%  30  83.3%  36  0.1% 
Moving  5  25.0%  15  75.0%  20  0.1% 
Other  50  20.1%  199  79.9%  249  0.8% 
Renewable Energy  2  40.0%  3  60.0%  5  0.0% 
Small Business  28  27.2%  75  72.8%  103  0.3% 
Vacation  1  7.7%  12  92.3%  13  0.0% 
Wedding  5  11.6%  38  88.4%  43  0.1% 
Educational  6  15.4%  33  84.6%  39  0.1% 
Total  4,681  14.8%  26,958  85.2%  31,639  100.0% 
Notes: Table 14 Panel A and B describe the count of loans categorized by Loan Purpose and by Social 
Disclosure (SD) and Non-disclosure (ND). ND represents loans with fewer than 10 words in the loan 
description. The number of words was set to 10 to offset date and time text automatically appended to the 
beginning of each loan description by the Lending Club platform. The total count and percentage of loans 
Charged Off and Fully Paid is provided at both the panel level and expressed as an overall total. 
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Table 15 Social Disclosure versus Non-disclosure Paid and Charged Off by Purpose 
 
  
Loan Purpose Charged Off ($) % Fully Paid ($) % Total ($) % 
Panel A: SD $47,105,325 14.9% $268,896,525 85.1% $316,001,850 92.7% 
Car $494,625 10.0% $4,470,775 90.0% $4,965,400 1.5% 
Credit card $7,396,675 13.1% $49,149,250 86.9% $56,545,925 16.6% 
Debt Consolidation $25,931,725 14.6% $151,104,250 85.4% $177,035,975 51.9% 
Home Improvement $2,479,275 13.5% $15,866,350 86.5% $18,345,625 5.4% 
House $404,400 12.8% $2,756,675 87.2% $3,161,075 0.9% 
Major Purchase $1,025,850 10.6% $8,622,900 89.4% $9,648,750 2.8% 
Medical $544,225 18.8% $2,352,575 81.2% $2,896,800 0.8% 
Moving $295,175 13.7% $1,857,750 86.3% $2,152,925 0.6% 
Other $3,117,425 16.7% $15,530,050 83.3% $18,647,475 5.5% 
Renewable Energy $102,825 21.2% $382,150 78.8% $484,975 0.1% 
Small Business $3,997,550 29.6% $9,497,350 70.4% $13,494,900 4.0% 
Vacation $185,425 14.7% $1,078,475 85.3% $1,263,900 0.4% 
Wedding $612,925 11.9% $4,552,575 88.1% $5,165,500 1.5% 
Educational $517,225 23.6% $1,675,400 76.4% $2,192,625 0.6% 
Panel B: ND $4,465,025 17.9% $20,452,550 82.1% $24,917,575 7.3% 
Car $59,400 15.9% $313,075 84.1% $372,475 0.1% 
Credit card $607,575 14.4% $3,624,525 85.6% $4,232,100 1.2% 
Debt Consolidation $2,444,400 17.9% $11,227,425 82.1% $13,671,825 4.0% 
Home Improvement $245,100 13.7% $1,542,400 86.3% $1,787,500 0.5% 
House $39,175 18.3% $174,500 81.7% $213,675 0.1% 
Major Purchase $155,300 21.7% $559,125 78.3% $714,425 0.2% 
Medical $26,700 12.3% $190,425 87.7% $217,125 0.1% 
Moving $24,000 17.5% $113,225 82.5% $137,225 0.0% 
Other $360,075 22.6% $1,233,775 77.4% $1,593,850 0.5% 
Renewable Energy $31,000 59.9% $20,750 40.1% $51,750 0.0% 
Small Business $362,125 28.3% $918,450 71.7% $1,280,575 0.4% 
Vacation $12,000 24.4% $37,175 75.6% $49,175 0.0% 
Wedding $51,925 15.1% $293,000 84.9% $344,925 0.1% 
Educational $46,250 18.4% $204,700 81.6% $250,950 0.1% 
Total $51,570,350 15.1% $289,349,075 84.9% $340,919,425 100.0% 
Notes: Table 15 Panel A and B describe the dollar value of loans categorized by Loan Purpose and by 
Social Disclosure (SD) and Non-disclosure (ND). ND represents loans with fewer than 10 words in the 
loan description. The number of words was set to 10 to offset date and time text automatically appended to 
the beginning of each loan description by the Lending Club platform. The total count and percentage of 
loans Charged Off and Fully Paid is provided at both the panel level and expressed as an overall total. 
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Next, we observe the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used in 
Table 16 Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics. Clear differences between the 
Percent Invested and the Duration times exist between Fully Paid loans and Charged Off 
loans. Investors funded 93% of the Fully Paid loans, whereas less investment was made 
into loans that were eventually Charged Off. The Duration times for loans that are 
eventually Fully Paid are also lower at every loan grade compared to the Charged Off 
loans. The Percentage of Recovered Principal is obviously higher for Fully paid loans, 
and as expected the A grade Charged Off loans have a 5% higher recovered principal 
percentage relative to the next highest loan grade and 13% higher than the worst loan 
grade. 
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Table 16 Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Grade Tot_Inv (%) Pct. Inv. (%) Duration (hrs.) Tot. Rec. Prncp 
(%) 
Panel A: Charged Off 99% 88% 215.09 35% 
A 99% 96% 202.59 42% 
B 99% 92% 210.36 37% 
C 99% 88% 206.99 35% 
D 99% 87% 215.43 33% 
E 99% 72% 255.74 33% 
F 98% 62% 272.13 29% 
G 98% 61% 269.88 34% 
Panel B: Fully Paid 99% 93% 195.77 99% 
A 99% 96% 191.95 99% 
B 99% 95% 189.97 99% 
C 99% 91% 195.70 99% 
D 100% 89% 204.65 100% 
E 99% 79% 233.28 99% 
F 99% 72% 252.38 99% 
G 98% 69% 252.86 98% 
Total 99% 92% 198.63 90% 
Notes: Table 16 Panel A describes the dependent variables for Charged Off loans by Loan Grade and Panel 
B: Describes the Fully Paid loans by Loan Grade. Percent Invested (Pct. Inv.) is the percentage of funding 
received from ordinary and institutional investors. Duration is the average number of hours between the 
Note Submission and Note Issue date.  The Percentage of Recovered Principal (Tot. Rec. Prncp) is the 
average percentage of Principal repaid by the borrower. 
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In Table, 18, 19, 20, and 21 the content analysis variables demonstrate differences 
between Fully Paid and Charged Off loans. The Word Count on average is higher for 
Fully Paid loans, while the Misspellings are lower, Updates are higher and Questions 
Answered are higher. The Flesch Index readability score is consistent across both 
Charged Off and Fully paid loans and most loan grades. Interestingly, it appears higher 
risk borrowers (E, F, and G grades) in provide fewer Updates to their loan descriptions, 
which may be correlated to their higher words count. Lower grades also average about 
one additional lender question compared to lower risk loan grades. There is parity 
between the majority of content analysis independent variables with the exception of the 
hardworking identity claim, educational explanation, and other debt rate explanation. 
These variables are further reviewed in the regression analysis section. 
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Table 17 Independent Variables Social Disclosure Forms Averages 
Grade Word Count Updates QA Total Misspellings Flesch Index 
Panel A: Charged Off 58.25 0.94 1.28 0.70 64.80 
A 55.56 1.12 0.87 0.68 65.29 
B 50.77 0.99 1.07 0.56 65.36 
C 57.78 0.96 1.27 0.66 65.02 
D 62.63 0.96 1.48 0.83 65.12 
E 67.74 0.65 1.79 0.97 60.88 
F 84.74 0.39 1.99 1.07 63.81 
G 90.28 0.20 2.21 1.04 60.77 
Panel B: Fully Paid 63.95 0.98 1.36 0.54 64.63 
A 61.10 1.07 1.09 0.45 64.65 
B 62.05 1.04 1.27 0.52 64.86 
C 63.76 0.91 1.42 0.57 64.75 
D 69.26 0.88 1.85 0.66 64.98 
E 80.97 0.60 2.07 0.83 61.64 
F 90.59 0.47 2.38 0.77 59.92 
G 80.30 0.35 2.88 0.63 63.84 
Total Average 63.10 0.97 1.35 0.56 64.65 
Notes: Table 17 Panel A describes the text analysis independent variables for Charged Off loans by Loan 
Grade and Panel B: Describes the Fully Paid loans by Loan Grade. Word count is the average number of 
words in the loan description, misspellings are the average number of errors found using the Winnow-
based spelling correction algorithm. Updates, Questions and Answers (QA Total) and Flesch Index are 
average values. 
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Table 18 Independent Variables Herzenstein et al. (2011) Identity Claims Frequency 
Grade Trustworthy Successful Economic 
Hardship 
Hardworking Moral Religious 
Panel A: Charge Off 22% 3% 6% 28% 18% 0% 
A 21% 3% 5% 28% 17% 0% 
B 17% 2% 4% 23% 13% 0% 
C 18% 3% 5% 26% 16% 0% 
D 21% 3% 6% 27% 16% 0% 
E 23% 1% 6% 32% 21% 1% 
F 25% 3% 7% 36% 19% 1% 
G 27% 3% 10% 27% 25% 0% 
Panel B: Fully Paid 25% 3% 7% 34% 19% 0% 
A 23% 3% 5% 34% 17% 0% 
B 21% 2% 5% 31% 16% 0% 
C 22% 2% 5% 31% 16% 0% 
D 23% 3% 6% 33% 18% 1% 
E 27% 4% 7% 38% 21% 0% 
F 32% 3% 9% 36% 20% 0% 
G 30% 6% 10% 34% 23% 0% 
Total Average 22% 3% 5% 32% 17% 0% 
Notes:  
Table 18 describes the frequency of the content analysis independent variables for Identity Claims 
and average HSCORE across the loan grades. Panel A describes Charged Off loans by Loan Grade 
and Panel B: Describes the Fully Paid loans by Loan Grade. HSCORE is average number Identity 
Claims used per loan description in the Sample. Trustworthy, Successful, Economic Hardship, 
Hardworking, Moral, and Religious identity claims are scored a 1 if used in the loan description and 0 
otherwise.   
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Table 19 Independent Variables Lewis (2011) Qualifier Phrases Counts 
Grade Credit No 
Credit 
Less 
Credit 
Loan No 
Loan 
Less 
Loan 
Debt No 
Debt 
Less 
Debt 
Panel A: Charge Off 40% 2% 10% 41% 3% 3% 24% 2% 9% 
A 42% 3% 9% 42% 3% 3% 23% 2% 10% 
B 42% 2% 9% 45% 2% 2% 26% 2% 9% 
C 41% 3% 11% 44% 3% 3% 26% 2% 10% 
D 42% 2% 13% 46% 3% 3% 28% 2% 10% 
E 41% 3% 9% 46% 4% 4% 23% 2% 10% 
F 44% 2% 7% 36% 2% 2% 22% 1% 4% 
G 25% 1% 11% 31% 7% 7% 21% 1% 7% 
Panel B: Fully Paid 40% 3% 10% 45% 3% 3% 25% 3% 9% 
A 42% 3% 10% 48% 3% 3% 26% 2% 9% 
B 41% 3% 11% 46% 3% 3% 27% 2% 10% 
C 41% 3% 10% 46% 3% 3% 26% 3% 10% 
D 41% 2% 11% 45% 3% 3% 25% 3% 10% 
E 39% 3% 11% 45% 2% 2% 24% 3% 10% 
F 41% 2% 7% 45% 3% 3% 25% 3% 5% 
G 37% 4% 11% 38% 4% 4% 19% 3% 7% 
Total 41% 3% 10% 46% 3% 3% 26% 2% 10% 
Notes: Table 19 describes the frequency of keywords and qualifying phrases used in a loan 
description. Panel A describes Charged Off loans by Loan Grade and Panel B: Describes the Fully 
Paid loans by Loan Grade. Credit, No Credit, Less Credit, Loan, No Loan, Less Loan, Debt, No Debt, 
and Less Debt are scored a 1 if used in the loan description and 0 otherwise.  Credit, Loan, and Debt 
combination are scored a 1 if any of the components are equal to 1. 
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Table 20 Michels (2012) Borrower Explanations 
Grade Education Poor 
Credit 
Monthly 
Expenses 
Other 
Debt Rate  
Amount of 
Other Debt 
Panel A: Charged Off 2.23% 0.68% 2.18% 3.88% 0.71% 
A 0.57% 0.19% 3.04% 4.55% 1.90% 
B 1.35% 0.78% 1.98% 3.75% 0.99% 
C 1.55% 0.93% 1.86% 4.65% 1.16% 
D 2.10% 0.74% 3.26% 3.26% 1.47% 
E 2.26% 1.61% 2.90% 3.23% 0.65% 
F 3.31% 0.00% 1.65% 4.13% 0.00% 
G 2.82% 0.00% 1.41% 4.23% 0.00% 
Panel B: Fully Paid 3.61% 0.62% 3.04% 7.54% 1.33% 
A 2.24% 0.47% 3.30% 7.42% 1.63% 
B 2.68% 0.78% 3.80% 7.19% 1.92% 
C 2.59% 0.94% 3.18% 7.10% 1.37% 
D 2.51% 0.87% 3.38% 7.23% 1.54% 
E 4.07% 1.28% 3.75% 8.57% 0.96% 
F 8.20% 0.00% 2.34% 8.59% 0.39% 
G 2.99% 0.00% 1.49% 6.72% 1.49% 
Total 2.47% 0.75% 3.29% 6.81% 1.56% 
Notes:  Table 20 describes the frequency of borrower Explanations that meet the scoring criteria. Panel A 
describes Charged Off loans by Loan Grade and Panel B: Describes the Fully Paid loans by Loan Grade. 
MSCORE is the average number of borrower explanations used per loan description in the sample. 
Education, Poor Credit, Monthly Expenses, Other Debt Rate, and Amount of Other Debt are scored a 1 if 
used in the loan description and 0 otherwise.   
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Regressions 
Ordinary Least Squares regression, Tobit, and Binomial logistic regression are 
used in this analysis to answer each hypothesis. For testing Duration for H1 and H5, 
ordinary least squares linear estimation is used to explain the distribution of the 
dependent variable against different models of independent variables.  The OLS is to 
finds the set of weights for (a and b) that provide the best unbiased estimate for the 
Duration variable and provides minimum-variance mean-unbiased estimation. The OLS 
takes the form of: 
𝑌?̃? = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀?̃? 
 
Where  
?̃?𝑡= dependent variable (percent funding by investors) 
𝑋𝑡= each independent variable term 
𝜀?̃?= error term that captures the difference between actuals and the predicted model 
The Tobit model is used in this analysis for H2, H3, H6, and H7 in order to estimate 
linear relationships between variables due to censoring in the dependent variables. For 
example, the dependent variables Total Investment, Percent Investment, and Total 
Recovered Principal have a maximum value of 100%. The upper bound limitation of 
100% indicates observations are being censored from above. The Tobit Model is 
designed to handle censoring from above and cases when the values are the maximum 
threshold of 100% (Tobin, 1958). In terms of P2P lending the true value might be equal 
to a number higher than the upper threshold if the Lending Club platform allowed for 
funding to exceed the borrower’s requested amount. In order to examine the determinants 
of Percent Invested and Percentage of Recovered Principal variables while accounting for 
zero values, the following latent regression model is used. 
𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝑥′𝑡𝛽 + 𝜇𝑡 
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The model assumes the latent variable is 𝑌𝑡
∗ and that the variable linearly depends 
on a set of exogenous variables 𝑥′𝑡 and 𝛽 a vector, which determines the relationship 
between exogenous variables and the latent variable. The threshold value is set to T 
(T=100%) because there is censoring from above. The model below can be used for 
Tobit model specifications and maximum likelihood techniques to create estimates for 
the censored variables. 
𝑌𝑡 {
𝑌𝑡
∗
100%
  
If   𝑦𝑡
∗ < 100% 
0 otherwise
  
Binomial Logistic Regression will be used to test the effect of signals on a loan 
being Charged Off or Fully Paid, for H4 and H8. Loan Status is the dependent variable 
and the sample is limited to only loans that have reached maturity. The dependent 
variable is the probability of the event to occur, and Loan Status of Fully Paid fi is 
converted into a number between zero and one, the following transformation is used: 
𝑝𝑖 =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑓1
 
This study assumes that fi is an unobserved continuous number representing the 
likelihood of a default. Therefore, higher fi value is indicative of higher probability of full 
payment. Where pi is the probability that full payment will occur. It is further assumed 
that n independent variables in the binary logistic regressions are linearly related to fi. As 
previously referenced, the Emekter et al. (2015) study also uses binomial logistic 
regression to test the likelihood of default. In contrast to previous work, this study 
observes loans between June 2007 and April 2013 and removes assumptions that every 
loan that is late will be charged off and every loan that is current will always be fully 
paid. Instead, we limit our observations to only ex post 36-month term Fully Paid and 
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Charged Off loans in order to unambiguously understand the determinants of 
creditworthiness on peer-to-peer platforms. The methodology is designed to test the 
social disclosures Lenders perceive as credible then produce results that indicate if the 
Fully Paid loans decrease or increase in the same direction as the hypothesized sign. The 
standard logistic regression is used that follows the format below: 
𝑓𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐵0,𝐵1𝑋𝑖 , 𝐵2𝑋𝑖 , 𝐵3𝑋𝑖 , 𝐵4𝑋𝑖 , … , 𝐵𝑛𝑋𝑖) + ℰ𝑖   
Lastly, a test of mean difference between two populations of loan descriptions is 
performed between with loan with and without descriptions. Additionally, examination of 
ex post returns to show the difference in performance between loans will also be 
performed. For P2P lending the ex post returns are calculated as the total recovered 
principal plus interest, minus the principal paid by the lender. The summary of the 
findings from the multiple forms of analysis are then provided in the conclusion section 
of the dissertation.  
 
Duration Results 
 In Table 21 the Duration dependent variable measures the number of hours 
required between loan submission date and loan issue date.  In the first model for 
Duration, each of the independent variables were found to be significant and carry the 
sign consistent with hypothesis H1. The Updates variable is the most significant form of 
social disclosure (Model 1: β = -6.083, SE = 0.708) across each of the models. Each 
Update provided by the borrower results in roughly a 6-hour reduction in the Duration 
time required to fund the loan. In addition, noteworthy when the social disclosure forms 
are combined with the content variables, Model 3, there is a slight increase in the size of 
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the beta coefficients for Updates (Model 3: β = -6.107***, SE = 0.710). It is also 
important to note a sign change for Word Count between Model 1 and Model 3. When 
the word count is combined with content variables each additional word increases the 
time required to fully fund the loan (Model 3: β = 0.034***, SE = 0.012). Questions 
Answered and Flesch Scores are significant at the 10% level and are found to help reduce 
the Duration time required in both Model 1 and Model 3. Consistent with expectations, 
Misspellings carry the hypothesized positive sign and increases Duration time in both 
models. The beta coefficient for Misspellings (Model 1: β =1.672***, SE = 0.366), 
however becomes smaller when combined with the content explanatory factors (Model 3: 
β =1.583***, SE = 0.367) suggesting that specific content within the loan description 
may mitigate Misspelling errors to lenders. Interestingly, the forms of social disclosure 
within Model 1 have a positive interaction with content variables. 
 The results suggest the forms of social disclosure influence content variables 
more than content variables influence the forms of social disclosure. Identity claim 
coefficients in Model 2 increase in Model 3 when combined with each form of social 
disclosure.  The following increases in beta coefficients are observed for each identity 
claim variable: Trustworthy (Model 2: β = -0.017*, SE = 1.658, Model 3: β = -0.699*, SE 
= 1.675), Successful (Model 2: β = -0.688*, SE = 3.358, Model 2: β = -2.543*, SE = 
3.401), Hardworking (Model 2 β = -6.043***, SE = 1.277, Model 3 = -6.409***, SE = 
1.323).  The same results are found for all of the key words and qualifiers for Credit 
Combo (Model 2 β = -1.756*, SE = 1.194, Model 3 β = -2.142*,    SE = 1.203), Loan 
Combo (Model 2: β =-3.13***, SE = 1.084, Model 3 = -3.428***, SE = 1.103), and Debt 
Combo (Model 2: β = -3.826***, SE = 1.195, Model 3 β= -4.018***, SE = 1.207). The 
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Duration is also reduced when loan explanations are combined with the different forms of 
social disclosure. The findings from Michels (2012) explanation variables indicate 
Education explanation reduces funding duration by 1 hours (Model 2:  β = -0.757*, SE = 
3.386, Model 3 = -1.747*, SE = 3.401).  Monthly Expense explanations are funded over 
one and half hour’s sooners (Model 2: β = -6.181**, SE = 3.031, Model 3 = β -7.883**, 
SE = 3.085) and Other Debt Rate and Amount of Other Debt explanations are funded 
roughly over 30 minutes faster respectively (Model 2: β = -1.949*, SE = 2.179, Model 3 
= β = -2.681*, SE = 2.210, Model 2: β = -1.281*, SE = 3.569, Model 3: β = -1.757*, SE 
= 3.577). Notably, content disclosures related to a borrower’s economic hardship, morals, 
religion, and poor credit explanation were not significant factors for lender investment in 
Model 2 and 3. Furthermore, the findings support H5 that the specific content within 
social disclosures reduces the funding time. This implies social disclosures reduce the 
time required for lenders to make investment decisions. 
Total Invested Results 
 In Table 22 the Total Invested dependent variable measures both the retail and 
institutional investors as well as the Lending Club subsidiaries investment in a loan. The 
Total Invested model is the most important variable for borrowers seeking loans on the 
Lending Club platform. Each form of social disclosure proved to be significant across 
each model, but coefficients did not always carry the hypothesized sign. The Word Count 
(Model 1: β = -0.001**, SE = 0.00), Updates (Model 1: β = -0.014*, SE = 0.018), and 
Flesch Index (Model 1: β = -0.001*, SE = 0.001) variables had an unexpected negative 
relationship with Total Invested that is inconsistent with H2. The Misspellings, as 
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expected, has a negative relationship (Model 1: β = -0.12*, SE = 0.00). The Questions 
Answered (Model 1: β = 0.029***, SE = 0.10) variable is the only social disclosure that 
increased Total Investment by 2.9% for each question answered by borrowers. These 
results may be attributable to Lending Club subsidiaries funding loans that were less 
attractive to retail and institutional investors and would not be issued unless the 
subsidiary invested. Similar findings for Total Investment are also seen within the content 
variables.  
 Identity Claim variables for Trustworthy, Successful, Hardworking, and 
Religious also have a negative relationship with the Total Invested variable. These 
identity claims each resulted in less Total Investment with Religious identity claims 
reducing Total Invested by 22.7% per claim. The only positive relationship amongst the 
identity claim variables is the Moral identity claim, which increase the Total Invested by 
6.3% per claim. Additional findings demonstrate keywords and qualifiers have negative 
relationships with Credit and Loan variables. Contrary to H6, the mention of credit and 
loan phrases reduce investment between 1.2% and 4.1% across the respective models. 
The only positive relationship found is the Debt keyword and qualifier (Model 2: β = 
0.03*, SE = 0.033, Model 3: β = 0.035, SE = 0.34).  Lastly, the explanation variables for 
Other Debt Rate and Amount of Other Debt proved to have a negative relationship with 
the Total Invested variable for both Model 2 and Model 3. The findings for Total 
Investment are in stark contrast to the findings for Percent Invested. 
Percent Invested Results 
 In Table 23 the Percent Invested dependent variable table demonstrates the 
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amount of investment provided by only retail and institutional investors. The results 
suggest that different forms of social disclosures and the specific language used within 
the disclosure influence retail and institutional investment. Hypothesis H2 proved true for 
Word Count, Updates, Questions Answered and Flesch Index.  These variables were 
significant across Model 1 and Model 3. As expected, the only social disclosure not 
found to be significant or carry the hypothesized sign for Percent Invested was the 
Misspellings variable. The most notable variables include Updates and Questions 
Answered that have large beta coefficients that indicate that for each Update, there is an 
11% increase in the Percent Invested and each Question Answered increases the Percent 
Invested between 0.5% and 0.6% between each respective model. For each unit increase 
in Word Count there is a .004% change in Percent Invested in Model 1. The results also 
indicate that a 1-unit increase in Flesch Index score equates to .1% increase in the 
funding amount invested by retail and institutional investors in Model 1 and Model 3. 
The findings also show that the retail and institutional lenders change the amount of 
investment based on the content provided in the loan description.  
 The results suggest that removing Lending Club Subsidiary funding and limiting 
investment to retail and institutional changes the sign and significance of content 
variables.  The identity claim analysis indicates a 3.7% to 4.9% increase in retail and 
institutional lender investment based on the hardworking identity claim (Model 2: β = 
0.049***, SE = 0.004, (Model 3: β = 0.037*, SE = 0.004). This is a significant change 
from the Total Invested models where Hardworking has a negative relationship with 
Total Investment. However, claims for Trustworthy, Successful, Economic Hardship, and 
Moral maintain a negative relationship with Percent Invested in Model 2. Interestingly, 
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Model 3 findings support for H6, while Model 2 is not strongly supported. When identity 
claims and the forms of social disclosures are combined in Model 3 Trustworthy and 
Successful identity claims change signs and demonstrate a positive relationship with the 
Percent Invested variable. Religious claims also increase substantially from .3% in Model 
2 to 2.5% in Model 3. The keyword and qualifier analysis also have mixed results. 
Combinations of Credit keywords and qualifiers have a negative relationship with 
Percent Invested, while combinations of loan and debt keywords and qualifiers have a 
positive influence on the Percent Invested in both Model 2 and Model 3. The 
explanations provided by borrowers also had unexpected results inconsistent with H6. 
The Poor Credit explanation variable is significant at the 1% level and had a positive 
relationship with the Percent Invested dependent variable (Model 2: β = 0.014***, SE = 
0.023, Model 3: β = 0.069***, SE = 0.022). A Poor Credit explanation increased retail 
and intuitional investment by 1.4% and 6.9% respectively across each model. 
Counterintuitively, providing an Educational or Other Interest Rate explanation reduced 
retail and institutional investment. In Model 2 and Model 3 Education explanations 
reduced funding by 3.2% and .3% respectively (Model 2: β = -0.032***, SE = 0.011, 
Model 3: β = -0.003***, SE = 0.003). In addition, obtaining lower interest rate 
explanations reduced Percent Invested by 3.1% in Model 2 and 2.8% in Model 3. The 
results also indicate that providing a breakdown of monthly expenses and other debt 
obligations increase lender investment. Loans with Monthly Expense explanations 
received 3.2% and 3.4% more lender investment and the Other Amount of Debt 
Explanations received 8.7% and 7.5% more investment in Model 2 and 3 respectively. In 
the following analysis, the findings related to funding a loan in H1, H2, H5, and H6 are 
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analyzed from a loan repayment lens to test Total Recovered Principal and Loan status 
for H3, H4, H7, and H8. 
Total Recovered Principal Results 
 In Table 24 the Total Recovered Principal returned to lenders from borrowers is 
examined. The Total Recovered Principal is arguably the most important dependent 
variable to lenders on the Lending Club platform. Understanding the factors associated 
with creditworthiness makes a direct and tangible impact on the lenders portfolio 
performance. The results indicate H3 is true for Word Count and that for every additional 
word used in the loan description there is a .04% increase in Model 1 and .02% increase 
in Model 3 for Total Recovered Principal. In other words, a loan description of 100 
words is expected to increase the Total Recovered Principal by 4.0% and 2.0% 
respectively ceteris paribus. H3 is also true for the Updates variable and is positively 
related to the Total Recovered Principal at the 1% significance level. The results indicate 
that for each additional Update there is a negative 5% increase in Total Recovered 
Principal. This finding might suggest higher quality borrowers are more likely to make 
subsequent updates to their original loan description. These results might also suggest 
that poorer borrowers update more often because they know their true creditworthiness 
and feel more justification is required. The Questions Answered variable also 
demonstrates a positive relationship with Total Recovered Principal as hypothesized in 
H3 (Model 1: β = 0.026***, SE = 0.004, Model 3: β = 0.025***, SE = 0.004). Each time 
that a borrower answers a question raised by a lender there is a 2.6% increase in Model 1 
and 2.5% increase in Model 3 for Total Recovered Principal. Misspellings are consistent 
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with the hypothesized sign for H3 (Model 1: β = -0.03***, SE = 0.004, Model 3: β =         
-0.027***, SE = 0.004). Each Misspelling in the loan description is associated with a 
3.0% and 2.7% reduction in the Total Recovered Principal in Model 1 and 3 respectively. 
The Flesch Index score was also significant across both of the models suggesting a well-
written loan description is an indicator of credit worthiness and loan repayment.  Content 
within the loan descriptions also proved to be significant. 
 Consistent with Hypothesis H7, the specific content within the loan disclosure is 
found to be a predictor of loan performance. Beginning with identity claims, we observe 
that the Hardworking and Trustworthy claims increases the Total Recovered Principal 
between in both Model 2 and Model 3. Borrowers identifying as Trustworthy repaid 
2.1% more principal in Model 1 and 2.3% more in Model 3. The Hardworking variable 
made the most significant impact increasing the Total Recovered Principal by 9% and 8% 
(Model 2: β = 0.09***, SE = 0.016, Model 3: β = 0.088***, SE = 0.017). Equally 
important, several identity claims result in a reduction of the Total Recovered Principal. 
Successful, Economic Hardship, Moral and Religious are all negatively related to 
recovering the loan principal. Religious claims reduce the recovered principal the most of 
the identity claims (Model 2: β = -0.08*, SE = 0.126, Model 3: β = -0.085*, SE = 0.126) 
followed by claims of being Successful (Model 2: β = 0.066*, SE = 0.042, Model 3: β = -
0.055***, SE = 0.042). All of the Lewis (2011) keyword and qualifier variables proved 
to be significant at the 1% level in both Model 2 and Model 3 with debt keywords and 
qualifiers increasing the recovered principal by 9%. The most significant findings across 
all of the content variables are the Michels (2012) explanation variables. The results show 
having demonstrated successful completion of education increase the Total Recovered 
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Principal 18.3% in Model 2 and 19.2% in Model 3. Additionally, borrowers that provided 
the other rates of interest repaid approximately 10% more principal. These findings 
demonstrate a clear difference between Total Invested, Percent Invested, and Total 
Recovered Principal. The content variables significant for a lender to fund a loan are 
inconsistent with borrower repayment of the loan. The explanations detrimental to 
lenders are Poor Credit explanations and borrowers listing their other debt obligations. 
Interestingly, Poor Credit explanation borrowers pay 7.3% less principal in Model 2 and 
4.7% less principal in Model 3.  This suggest that the interaction between Poor Credit 
explanations different forms of social disclosure result in 2.6% more principal being 
recovered. In the last regression analysis, the Total Recovered Principal is further 
examined in terms of total loan repayment and default. 
Loan Status Results 
The Lending Club platform has two terminal statuses for loans that have reached 
maturity, “Charged Off” and “Fully Paid”. In Table 25 the binomial logistic regression 
results are provided that indicate the explanatory variables significant for “Fully Paid” 
loans. The Loan Status results indicate that the most significant social disclosure 
indicator is the Questions Answered variable. Consistent with H8, for each question 
answered the odds of borrower fully repaying the loan increase 3.8% in Model 1 and 
3.6% in Model 3. While for each Misspellings the odds of fully paying the loan decrease 
by 6.8% in Model 1 and 6.1% in Model 3. Noteworthy, for each unit increase in Word 
Count there is a .2% increase in likelihood of repayment in Model 1. This increase based 
on Word Count reduces to zero when interaction with content variables are added in 
Model 3. In terms of identity claims, the results indicated that the only claim significant 
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for “Fully Paid” loans is Hardworking (Model 2: β = 0.211***, SE = 0.042, Model 3: β = 
0.21***, SE = 0.044). While the only claim significant for “Charged Off” loans in Moral 
(Model 2: β = -0.165***, SE = 0.057, Model 3 = -0.155***, SE = 0.058).  Each of these 
claims are significant at the 1% level. The Hardworking claim increases the likelihood of 
full loan repayment by approximately 21%, while the Moral claim reduced the likelihood 
of loan repayment between 16.5% and 15.5% in Model 2 and Model 3.  All of the 
keyword and qualifier variables were significant at the 1% level and positively related to 
the Loan Status of “Fully Paid” across both models. The most significant findings were in 
the loan explanations that demonstrate Education and Interest Rate on Other Debt 
separate good and bad borrowers. Educational explanations increased the likelihood of a 
“Fully Paid” loan status by approximately 40% (Model 2: β = -0.418***, SE = 0.127, 
Model 3 = 0.4***, SE = 0.128).  Similarly, the Interest Rate on Other Debt increased the 
likelihood of full loan repayment by roughly 38% (Model 2: 0.379***, SE = 0.083, 
Model 3 = 0.384***, SE = 0.084). These findings not only support H8, but also indicate 
the ability of social disclosures to signal borrower creditworthiness.  
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Table 21 Duration Analysis Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
(Constant) -66.34** 30.094 -69.146** 29.640 -64.906** 30.102 
word_count -0.008* 0.009 - - 0.034*** 0.012 
updates -6.083*** 0.708 - - -6.107*** 0.710 
qa_total -0.371* 0.313 - - -0.308* 0.314 
misspellings 1.672*** 0.366 - - 1.583*** 0.367 
flesch_index 0.003* 0.029 - - 0.005* 0.030 
trustworthy - - -0.017* 1.658 -0.699* 1.675 
successful - - -0.688* 3.358 -2.543* 3.401 
economic_hardship - - 2.382 2.426 0.335 2.492 
hardworking - - -6.043*** 1.277 -6.409*** 1.323 
moral - - 2.561 1.759 1.779 1.774 
religious - - 10.022 10.440 8.017 10.439 
credit_combo - - -1.756* 1.194 -2.142* 1.203 
loan_combo - - -3.13*** 1.084 -3.428*** 1.103 
debt_combo - - -3.826*** 1.195 -4.018*** 1.207 
edu_exp - - -0.757* 3.386 -1.747* 3.401 
poor_credit_exp - - 7.254 6.052 4.495 6.057 
mthly_expense_exp - - -6.181** 3.031 -7.883** 3.085 
oth_rate_exp - - -1.949* 2.179 -2.681* 2.210 
amnt_oth_debt_exp - - -1.281* 3.569 -1.757* 3.577 
verified_status -23.131*** 1.115 -22.665*** 1.116 -23.117*** 1.115 
car -4.134* 3.753 -4.165* 3.756 -4.617* 3.753 
credit_card -4.525** 2.267 -2.371* 2.383 -2.757* 2.382 
debt_consolidation -8.473*** 2.009 -6.226*** 2.092 -6.466*** 2.091 
educational 9.27 5.169 11.66** 5.178 9.506 5.182 
home_improvement -2.428* 2.800 -3.192* 2.804 -3.635* 2.804 
house 6.593 5.719 6.308 5.729 5.146 5.723 
major_purchase -4.487* 3.066 -5.109* 3.068 -5.097* 3.065 
medical 4.069 4.662 3.57 4.664 3.355 4.662 
moving 0.258 5.088 0.333 5.094 0.083* 5.089 
renewable_energy -1.501* 11.772 -3.689* 11.780 -2.627* 11.767 
small_business 23.7*** 3.282 23.976*** 3.264 21.603*** 3.305 
vacation 1.734 6.244 0.028* 6.249 0.606 6.242 
wedding -2.912* 4.191 -2.827* 4.196 -3.604* 4.192 
loan_amount_req_log 117.782*** 2.226 118.152*** 2.221 118.547*** 2.237 
FICO_avg -0.078*** 0.025 -0.07*** 0.025 -0.078*** 0.025 
dti 0.19** 0.079 0.179** 0.079 0.178** 0.079 
home_own 2.026 1.144 2.622** 1.147 2.59** 1.147 
married -0.686* 2.347 1.064 2.317 -0.282* 2.348 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
divorced 16.955*** 6.533 17.425*** 6.534 16.056** 6.534 
single -2.409* 3.761 -1.159* 3.752 -2.069* 3.760 
engaged -1.157* 12.505 1.262 12.499 -1.123* 12.498 
children 2.226 1.529 3.549** 1.496 2.331 1.532 
revol_util(%) -0.003* 0.024 -0.002* 0.024 0.001* 0.024 
mthly_inc_log -11.518*** 2.618 -11.925*** 2.613 -11.765*** 2.622 
loan_vol_log 33.922*** 1.862 33.05*** 1.856 33.527*** 1.864 
credit_spread -1.606*** 0.246 -1.499*** 0.239 -1.718*** 0.247 
consumer_sentiment -0.967*** 0.085 -1.096*** 0.084 -0.998*** 0.085 
per_capita_wage_log -22.662*** 5.038 -22.181*** 5.040 -21.735*** 5.036 
       
R Square 0.239  0.238  0.240  
Adjusted R Square 0.238  0.237  0.239  
F statistic 223.94  280.48  203.51  
Number of 
Observations 
31549  31550  31549  
Notes:  Table 21 provides the results of the ordinary least squares regression for dependent 
variable Duration using Lending Club data. Model 1 includes the forms social disclosure 
variables; Model 2 includes the content variables.  Model 3 is the integration model with the 
forms of social disclosures and content variables. P-value of .10 is represented with a *, p-value 
of .05 of less is represented with two **, and p-value of .01 or less is represented with three ***. 
Cells with “-” indicate the areas that did not have adequate data to perform the analysis or 
variables not included in the model. 
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Table 22 Total Invested Analysis Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
(Intercept):1 -0.116* 0.838 -0.58* 0.795 -0.083* 0.837 
(Intercept):2 -0.211*** 0.011 -0.239*** 0.011 -0.218*** 0.012 
word_count -0.0005** 0.0002 - - 0.0004* 0.0003 
updates -0.014* 0.018 - - -0.01* 0.018 
qa_total 0.029*** 0.010 - - 0.03*** 0.010 
misspellings -0.012* 0.009 - - -0.011* 0.009 
flesch_index -0.0007* 0.0008 - - -0.0007* 0.0008 
trustworthy - - -0.072* 0.041 -0.065* 0.043 
successful - - -0.046* 0.076 -0.025* 0.080 
economic_hardship - - -0.04* 0.059 -0.009* 0.063 
hardworking - - -0.063* 0.033 -0.046* 0.036 
moral - - 0.063* 0.044 0.077* 0.046 
religious - - -0.227* 0.217 -0.238* 0.222 
credit_combo - - -0.041* 0.034 -0.034* 0.035 
loan_combo - - -0.023* 0.030 -0.012* 0.031 
debt_combo - - 0.03* 0.033 0.035* 0.034 
edu_exp - - 0.122 0.093 0.136 0.097 
poor_credit_exp - - 0.504 0.348 0.522 0.355 
mthly_expense_exp - - 0.116 0.083 0.157 0.088 
oth_rate_exp - - -0.037* 0.052 -0.019* 0.054 
amnt_oth_debt_exp - - -0.104* 0.089 -0.089* 0.091 
verified_status 0.033* 0.032 0.026* 0.031 0.031* 0.032 
car 0.068* 0.106 0.071* 0.103 0.073* 0.105 
credit_card 0.113 0.063 0.128** 0.065 0.125 0.067 
debt_consolidation 0.09* 0.055 0.1* 0.056 0.095* 0.058 
educational 0.059* 0.135 0.061* 0.131 0.059* 0.135 
home_improvement 0.032* 0.075 0.029* 0.073 0.035* 0.075 
house 0.25 0.174 0.233 0.169 0.236 0.173 
major_purchase -0.019* 0.085 -0.02* 0.082 -0.016* 0.085 
medical -0.061* 0.132 -0.039* 0.128 -0.044* 0.132 
moving 0.008* 0.158 0.023* 0.154 0.021* 0.158 
renewable_energy 0.177 0.382 0.147 0.366 0.163 0.380 
small_business 0.083* 0.086 0.071* 0.083 0.095* 0.086 
vacation 0.093* 0.224 0.081* 0.217 0.096* 0.224 
wedding 0.058* 0.112 0.069* 0.109 0.068* 0.112 
loan_amount_req_log -1.519*** 0.084 -1.488*** 0.082 -1.52*** 0.085 
FICO_avg 0.006*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.001 
dti -0.002* 0.002 -0.002* 0.002 -0.002* 0.002 
home_own -0.014* 0.033 -0.012* 0.032 -0.013* 0.033 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
married -0.13** 0.053 -0.14*** 0.051 -0.13** 0.053 
divorced -0.213* 0.128 -0.248** 0.123 -0.232* 0.127 
single 0.062* 0.100 0.066* 0.097 0.079* 0.101 
engaged 0.174 0.363 0.165 0.349 0.174 0.359 
children -0.055* 0.040 -0.068* 0.038 -0.054* 0.040 
revol_util -0.107* 0.072 -0.101* 0.070 -0.1* 0.072 
mthly_inc_log 0.089* 0.076 0.11 0.074 0.09* 0.076 
loan_vol_log 0.854*** 0.046 0.832*** 0.043 0.85*** 0.046 
credit_spread 15.326*** 0.912 15.617*** 0.849 15.18*** 0.912 
consumer_sentiment 0.022*** 0.002 0.021*** 0.002 0.021*** 0.002 
per_capita_wage_log 0.0719 0.141 0.061 0.138 0.064 0.141 
       
R Square 0.031  0.03  0.031  
Adjusted R Square 0.03  0.029  0.03  
Number of 
Observations 
31549  31550  31549  
Notes: Table 22 provides the results of the Tobit regression for dependent variable Total Invested 
using Lending Club data. Model 1 includes the forms social disclosure variables; Model 2 
includes the content variables.  Model 3 is the integration model with the forms of social 
disclosures and content variables. P-value of .10 is represented with a *, p-value of .05 of less is 
represented with two **, and p-value of .01 or less is represented with three ***. Cells with “-” 
indicate the areas that did not have adequate data to perform the analysis or variables not included 
in the model. 
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Table 23 Percent Invested Analysis Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
(Intercept):1 -1.181*** 0.099 -1.378*** 0.102 -1.172*** 0.098 
(Intercept):2 -1.389*** 0.006 -1.331*** 0.006 -1.394*** 0.006 
word_count 0.0002*** 0.000003 - - 0.0004*** 0.000003 
updates 0.11*** 0.003 - - 0.11*** 0.003 
qa_total 0.006*** 0.001 - - 0.005*** 0.001 
misspellings -0.007*** 0.001 - - -0.007*** 0.001 
flesch_index 0.0006*** 0.00001 - - 0.0007*** 0.00001 
trustworthy - - -0.002* 0.006 0.006* 0.005 
successful - - -0.015* 0.011 0.012* 0.011 
economic_hardship - - -0.019** 0.008 -0.001* 0.008 
hardworking - - 0.049*** 0.004 0.037*** 0.004 
moral - - -0.005* 0.006 -0.001* 0.006 
religious - - 0.003* 0.035 0.025* 0.034 
credit_combo - - -0.006* 0.004 -0.003* 0.004 
loan_combo - - 0.006* 0.004 0.004* 0.004 
debt_combo - - 0.001* 0.004 0.006* 0.004 
edu_exp - - -0.031*** 0.011 -0.003* 0.011 
poor_credit_exp - - 0.014* 0.023 0.069*** 0.022 
mthly_expense_exp - - 0.032*** 0.011 0.034*** 0.010 
oth_rate_exp - - -0.031*** 0.007 -0.028*** 0.007 
amnt_oth_debt_exp - - 0.087*** 0.013 0.075*** 0.013 
verified_status -0.07*** 0.004 -0.092*** 0.004 -0.069*** 0.004 
car 0.08*** 0.013 0.084*** 0.013 0.08*** 0.013 
credit_card 0.06*** 0.007 0.065*** 0.008 0.065*** 0.008 
debt_consolidation 0.06*** 0.007 0.064*** 0.007 0.06*** 0.007 
educational -0.028* 0.015 -0.079*** 0.016 -0.029* 0.015 
home_improvement 0.043*** 0.009 0.044*** 0.010 0.045*** 0.009 
house 0.043** 0.019 0.036* 0.020 0.046** 0.019 
major_purchase 0.04*** 0.010 0.058*** 0.011 0.041*** 0.010 
medical 0.025* 0.016 0.018* 0.016 0.025* 0.016 
moving 0.037** 0.017 0.031* 0.018 0.033* 0.017 
renewable_energy 0.052* 0.042 0.099** 0.045 0.056* 0.042 
small_business -0.034*** 0.010 -0.067*** 0.011 -0.029*** 0.010 
vacation 0.046** 0.023 0.072*** 0.024 0.049** 0.023 
wedding 0.035*** 0.013 0.032** 0.014 0.037*** 0.013 
loan_amount_req_log -0.41*** 0.008 -0.415*** 0.008 -0.409*** 0.008 
FICO_avg 0.003*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 
dti 0* 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0* 0.000 
home_own -0.001* 0.004 -0.005* 0.004 -0.002* 0.004 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
married -0.017** 0.007 -0.036*** 0.008 -0.019*** 0.007 
divorced -0.025* 0.020 -0.039* 0.021 -0.022* 0.020 
single 0.013* 0.012 0.006* 0.013 0.013* 0.012 
engaged -0.094** 0.037 -0.141*** 0.039 -0.093** 0.037 
children -0.009* 0.005 -0.025*** 0.005 -0.01* 0.005 
revol_util 0.028*** 0.008 0.038*** 0.009 0.026*** 0.008 
mthly_inc_log 0.052*** 0.009 0.051*** 0.009 0.054*** 0.009 
loan_vol_log 0.382*** 0.006 0.458*** 0.006 0.379*** 0.006 
credit_spread 3.649*** 0.089 3.628*** 0.089 3.654*** 0.088 
consumer_sentiment 0.005*** 0.000 0.007*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.000 
per_capita_wage_log -0.013 0.017 -0.0232 0.018 -0.015 0.017 
       R Square 0.34  0.292  0.349  
Adjusted R Square 0.339  0.291  0.344  
Number of 
Observations 
31549  31550  31549  
Notes: Table 23 provides the results of the Tobit regression for dependent variable Percent Invested 
using Lending Club data. Model 1 includes the forms social disclosure variables; Model 2 includes 
the content variables.  Model 3 is the integration model with the forms of social disclosures and 
content variables. P-value of .10 is represented with a *, p-value of .05 of less is represented with two 
**, and p-value of .01 or less is represented with three ***. Cells with “-” indicate the areas that did 
not have adequate data to perform the analysis or variables not included in the model. 
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Table 24 Total Recovered Principle Analysis Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
(Intercept):1 0.048* 0.376 -0.421* 0.370 0.1 0.375 
(Intercept):2 -0.182*** 0.006 -0.183*** 0.006 -0.187*** 0.006 
word_count 0.0004*** 0.0001 - - 0.0002* 0.0001 
updates 0.05*** 0.009 - - 0.05*** 0.009 
qa_total 0.026*** 0.004 - - 0.025*** 0.004 
misspellings -0.03*** 0.004 - - -0.027*** 0.004 
flesch_index 0.0004* 0.0004 - - 0.0004* 0.0004 
trustworthy - - 0.021* 0.021 0.023* 0.022 
successful - - -0.066* 0.042 -0.055* 0.042 
economic_hardship - - -0.032* 0.031 -0.012* 0.032 
hardworking - - 0.09*** 0.016 0.088*** 0.017 
moral - - -0.053** 0.022 -0.045** 0.023 
religious - - -0.08* 0.126 -0.085* 0.126 
credit_combo - - 0.048*** 0.015 0.052*** 0.015 
loan_combo - - 0.048*** 0.014 0.049*** 0.014 
debt_combo - - 0.091*** 0.015 0.09*** 0.015 
edu_exp - - 0.183*** 0.047 0.192*** 0.047 
poor_credit_exp - - -0.073* 0.076 -0.047* 0.076 
mthly_expense_exp - - 0.061* 0.041 0.08* 0.042 
oth_rate_exp - - 0.101*** 0.029 0.109*** 0.030 
amnt_oth_debt_exp - - -0.009* 0.048 -0.014* 0.048 
verified_status -0.012* 0.014 -0.023* 0.014 -0.011* 0.014 
car 0.19*** 0.052 0.192*** 0.052 0.197*** 0.052 
credit_card 0.204*** 0.029 0.151*** 0.030 0.153*** 0.030 
debt_consolidation 0.134*** 0.025 0.085*** 0.026 0.082*** 0.026 
educational -0.032* 0.062 -0.062* 0.062 -0.047* 0.062 
home_improvement 0.025* 0.036 0.045* 0.036 0.047* 0.036 
house 0.085* 0.074 0.1 0.073 0.11 0.073 
major_purchase 0.188*** 0.042 0.203*** 0.042 0.201*** 0.042 
medical -0.088* 0.057 -0.068* 0.057 -0.069* 0.057 
moving 0.018* 0.064 0.022* 0.064 0.027* 0.064 
renewable_energy -0.14* 0.141 -0.095* 0.141 -0.119* 0.141 
small_business -0.258*** 0.038 -0.233*** 0.038 -0.211*** 0.038 
vacation -0.01* 0.080 0.003* 0.080 0.004* 0.080 
wedding 0.095* 0.054 0.102 0.054 0.108** 0.054 
loan_amount_req_log -0.448*** 0.029 -0.453*** 0.029 -0.466*** 0.029 
FICO_avg 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 
dti -0.005*** 0.001 -0.006*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 
home_own -0.017* 0.014 -0.029** 0.014 -0.029** 0.015 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
Beta Std. 
Error 
married -0.002* 0.030 -0.015* 0.029 -0.008* 0.030 
divorced -0.122* 0.079 -0.118* 0.079 -0.109* 0.079 
single 0.067* 0.049 0.055* 0.049 0.06* 0.049 
engaged 0.073* 0.169 0.065* 0.169 0.079* 0.169 
children -0.06*** 0.019 -0.071*** 0.019 -0.062*** 0.019 
revol_util -0.029* 0.031 -0.031* 0.031 -0.039* 0.031 
mthly_inc_log 0.406*** 0.034 0.431*** 0.034 0.41*** 0.034 
loan_vol_log 0.236*** 0.020 0.259*** 0.020 0.239*** 0.020 
credit_spread -3.858*** 0.295 -3.338*** 0.288 -3.717*** 0.295 
consumer_sentiment -0.002* 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 
per_capita_wage_log 0.163 0.064 0.163 0.064 0.145 0.064 
       
R Square 0.048  0.05  0.052  
Adjusted R Square 0.047  0.049  0.05  
Number of 
Observations 
31549  31550  31549  
Notes: Table 24 provides the results of the Tobit regression for dependent variable Total Recovered 
Principal using Lending Club data. Model 1 includes the forms social disclosure variables; Model 2 
includes the content variables.  Model 3 is the integration model with the forms of social disclosures and 
content variables. P-value of .10 is represented with a *, p-value of .05 of less is represented with two **, 
and p-value of .01 or less is represented with three ***. Cells with “-” indicate the areas that did not have 
adequate data to perform the analysis or variables not included in the model. 
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Table 25 Loan Status Analysis Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Exp(B) Std. 
Error 
Exp(B) Std. 
Error 
Exp(B) Std. 
Error 
Constant -5.04*** 0.947 -5.743*** 0.937 -4.925*** 0.950 
word_count 0.002*** 0.000 - - 0 0.000 
updates 0.035 0.022 - - 0.036 0.022 
qa_total 0.038*** 0.010 - - 0.036*** 0.010 
misspellings -0.068*** 0.010 - - -0.061*** 0.010 
flesch_index -0.001 0.001 - - -0.001 0.001 
trustworthy - - 0.074 0.055 0.072 0.055 
successful - - -0.092 0.107 -0.111 0.109 
economic_hardship - - -0.112 0.076 -0.093 0.079 
hardworking - - 0.211*** 0.042 0.21*** 0.044 
moral - - -0.165*** 0.057 -0.155*** 0.058 
religious - - -0.219 0.306 -0.231 0.307 
credit_combo - - 0.152*** 0.037 0.154*** 0.038 
loan_combo - - 0.144*** 0.034 0.143*** 0.035 
debt_combo - - 0.245*** 0.038 0.233*** 0.039 
edu_exp - - 0.418*** 0.127 0.4*** 0.128 
poor_credit_exp - - -0.136 0.187 -0.105 0.189 
mthly_expense_exp - - 0.103 0.108 0.13 0.111 
oth_rate_exp - - 0.379*** 0.083 0.384*** 0.084 
amnt_oth_debt_exp - - -0.051 0.126 -0.036 0.127 
verified_status -0.034 0.035 -0.044 0.034 -0.035 0.035 
car 0.413*** 0.135 0.432*** 0.135 0.439*** 0.136 
credit_card 0.526*** 0.071 0.383*** 0.075 0.381*** 0.075 
debt_consolidation 0.346*** 0.061 0.212*** 0.063 0.206*** 0.064 
educational -0.272* 0.143 -0.283** 0.144 -0.292** 0.144 
home_improvement 0.042 0.089 0.111 0.089 0.106 0.089 
house 0.12 0.184 0.181 0.184 0.191 0.184 
major_purchase 0.426*** 0.108 0.463*** 0.108 0.468*** 0.109 
medical -0.199 0.135 -0.133 0.135 -0.147 0.135 
moving 0.124 0.159 0.15 0.159 0.155 0.160 
renewable_energy -0.205 0.344 -0.123 0.342 -0.15 0.343 
small_business -0.72*** 0.090 -0.607*** 0.089 -0.601*** 0.091 
vacation 0.029 0.197 0.069 0.197 0.078 0.198 
wedding 0.333** 0.141 0.367*** 0.142 0.371*** 0.142 
loan_amount_req_log -0.592*** 0.072 -0.615*** 0.071 -0.635*** 0.072 
FICO_avg 0.007*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001 
dti -0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 
home_own -0.009 0.036 -0.035 0.036 -0.036 0.036 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Exp(B) Std. 
Error 
Exp(B) Std. 
Error 
Exp(B) Std. 
Error 
married 0.057 0.079 0.057 0.078 0.049 0.079 
divorced -0.152 0.208 -0.12 0.208 -0.123 0.209 
single 0.11 0.125 0.094 0.125 0.095 0.126 
engaged 0.25 0.481 0.23 0.477 0.208 0.478 
children -0.094* 0.048 -0.102** 0.047 -0.095** 0.049 
revol_util(%) -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
mthly_inc_log 1.027*** 0.085 1.081*** 0.085 1.031*** 0.086 
loan_vol_log 0.183*** 0.050 0.197*** 0.049 0.195*** 0.050 
consumer_sentiment -0.012*** 0.003 -0.011*** 0.003 -0.011*** 0.003 
per_capita_wage_log 0.453*** 0.161 0.428*** 0.161 0.408** 0.161 
       
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
0.059  0.059  0.061  
Nagelkerke R Square 0.104  0.104  0.107  
Number of 
Observations 
31550  31549  31549  
Notes: Table 25 provides the results of the binomial logistic regression for dependent variable Total 
Recovered Principal using Lending Club data. Model 1 includes the forms social disclosure variables; 
Model 2 includes the content variables.  Model 3 is the integration model with the forms of social 
disclosures and content variables. P-value of .10 is represented with a *, p-value of .05 of less is 
represented with two **, and p-value of .01 or less is represented with three ***. Cells with “-” indicate the 
areas that did not have adequate data to perform the analysis or variables not included in the model. 
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Robustness Testing 
Additional fine-tuning of the model is performed by observing inflection points in 
the data for each form of social disclosure using binomial logistic regression. Beginning 
with the Word Count, I set the Word Count at different intervals and observe no 
difference in the classification model’s ability to predict loan default. In Figure 5 Update 
Analysis , the fourth and fifth Update made by the borrower appear to be the inflection 
point where the predicted model begins to outperform the null classification model. The 
R2 increases from .054 for a single Update to .299 at the fifth Update demonstrating a 
significant improvement in the model’s explanatory power. In Figure 6, the number of 
Questions Answered R2 slightly increases across each interval. Whereas, there is a 
noticeable improvement in the predicted model for Misspellings at the fifth Misspelling 
in Figure 7. In loan descriptions with five or more Misspellings, the predicted model 
demonstrates 5.5% improvement in accuracy over the null classification model. The 
explanatory power of the model also improves with each subsequent Misspellings 
beginning with a R2 of .063 for the first Misspelling and ending with a value of .242 for 
the fifth Misspelling. Lastly, the Flesch Index score has a significant impact on the 
model’s predictive power. Flesch Index scores greater than 125 correctly identified 100% 
of the observations (n=54) with a R2 value of .636.  From these findings, there appear to 
be separating conditions between good and bad borrowers observable through different 
forms of social disclosure. 
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Figure 4 Word Count Analysis 
 
Word Count N Null Predicted R
2
 
Greater Than 0 31550 85.2 85.2 0.057 
Greater Than 10 29149 85.4 85.4 0.056 
Greater Than 50 13538 87 86.9 0.057 
Greater Than 100 5568 87.8 87.8 0.068 
Greater Than 150 2756 87.2 87.3 0.084 
Greater Than 200 1524 86.2 85.9 0.084 
Notes: This table provides the results of the binary logistic regression for dependent variable Loan Status using 
Lending Club data. The model measures word_count predictive ability and controls for: verified_status, car, 
credit_card, debt_consolidation, educational, home_improvement, house, major_purchase, medical, moving, 
renewable_energy, small_business, vacation, wedding, loan_amount_req_log, FICO_avg, dti, home_own, married, 
divorced, single, engaged, children, revol_util(%), mthly_inc_log, loan_vol_log, credit_spread, 
consumer_sentiment, per_capita_wage_log.        
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Figure 5 Update Analysis 
 
Updates N Null Predicted R
2
 
0 8040 83.2 83.3 0.054 
1 18416 83.2 85.8 0.054 
2 3750 86.3 86.3 0.072 
3 881 85.7 85.4 0.096 
4 274 85 86.1 0.145 
5+ 102 81.4 90.2 0.299 
Notes: This table provides the results of the binary logistic regression for dependent variable Loan Status 
using Lending Club data. The model measures Updates predictive ability and controls for: 
verified_status, car, credit_card, debt_consolidation, educational, home_improvement, house, 
major_purchase, medical, moving, renewable_energy, small_business, vacation, wedding, 
loan_amount_req_log, FICO_avg, dti, home_own, married, divorced, single, engaged, children, 
revol_util(%), mthly_inc_log, loan_vol_log, credit_spread, consumer_sentiment, per_capita_wage_log. 
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Figure 6 Questions Answered Analysis 
 
QA Total N Null Predicted R
2
 
0 14205 83.8 83.9 0.058 
1 6548 86.1 86.1 0.064 
2 4397 87.3 87.2 0.055 
3 2761 86.5 86.3 0.067 
4 1679 86.2 86.4 0.065 
5+ 883 85.3 85.8 0.095 
Notes: This table provides the results of the binary logistic regression for dependent variable Loan Status 
using Lending Club data. The model measures Updates predictive ability and controls for: 
verified_status, car, credit_card, debt_consolidation, educational, home_improvement, house, 
major_purchase, medical, moving, renewable_energy, small_business, vacation, wedding, 
loan_amount_req_log, FICO_avg, dti, home_own, married, divorced, single, engaged, children, 
revol_util(%), mthly_inc_log, loan_vol_log, credit_spread, consumer_sentiment, per_capita_wage_log.
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Figure 7 Misspellings Analysis 
 
Misspellings N Null Predicted R
2
 
0 23048 86 86 .054 
1 4988 84.2 84.4 0.063 
2 1672 81.3 80.7 0.073 
3 760 83.2 82.2 0.126 
4 392 82.9 83.2 0.112 
5+ 199 74.9 80.4 0.242 
Notes: This table provides the results of the binary logistic regression for dependent variable Loan Status 
using Lending Club data. The model measures Misspellings predictive ability and controls for: 
verified_status, car, credit_card, debt_consolidation, educational, home_improvement, house, 
major_purchase, medical, moving, renewable_energy, small_business, vacation, wedding, 
loan_amount_req_log, FICO_avg, dti, home_own, married, divorced, single, engaged, children, 
revol_util(%), mthly_inc_log, loan_vol_log, credit_spread, consumer_sentiment, per_capita_wage_log. 
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Figure 8 Flesch Index Analysis 
 
Flesch Index N Null Predicted R
2
 
Greater Than 0 31340 85.2 85.2 0.056625 
Greater Than 25 30806 85.3 85.3 0.056 
Greater Than 50 26178 85.3 85.3 0.056 
Greater Than 75 8645 84.1 84.1 0.058 
Greater Than 100 675 84.9 85.2 0.108 
Greater Than 125 54 79.6 100 .636 
Notes: This table provides the results of the binary logistic regression for dependent variable Loan Status 
using Lending Club data. The model measures Flesch Index predictive ability and controls for: 
verified_status, car, credit_card, debt_consolidation, educational, home_improvement, house, 
major_purchase, medical, moving, renewable_energy, small_business, vacation, wedding, 
loan_amount_req_log, FICO_avg, dti, home_own, married, divorced, single, engaged, children, 
revol_util(%), mthly_inc_log, loan_vol_log, credit_spread, consumer_sentiment, per_capita_wage_log. 
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The Loan Status results from the regression analysis are further tested and 
analyzed for robustness in the following section. I first test for the difference between 
high-grade and low-grade loans. The high-grade loans are represented by A, B, and C 
grade loans and low-grade loans reflect D, E, F, and G grade loans. Separation between 
each of these groups enables observation of borrowers with different levels of 
creditworthiness based on hard credit information. In Table 26, the test of two means test 
is performed.  Loan Status is used as the test variable in the analysis to determine whether 
the mean variance between Loan Status of Fully Paid is significantly different between 
high-grade and low-grade loans. The results indicate the null hypothesis should be 
rejected due to a probability of less than 1% (p<.001). In Table 27, an additional Two-
Means test is performed between loans with social disclosures and without social 
disclosures in the loan description. Word Count variable is used to separate the sample 
populations of loans with greater than one word in the loan description from the loan 
descriptions left blank by the borrower. The test results in Table 27 indicate a less than 
5% (p<.038) probability that non-disclosure loans are equal to loans with social 
disclosures. The loan grades and non-disclosure loans are used as selection criteria filters 
in the final models within this analysis. 
  
107 
 
 
Table 26 Two-Means Test for High Grade and Low Grade Loans 
Test Variable Grade Group N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
Mean 
Loan Status High Grade = 1 25874 .88 .33 .002 
Low Grade=0 5765 .75 .434 .006 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Loan Status Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
2-
tailed 
Mean 
Diff. 
Std. 
Error 
Diff. 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 
2019.754 0.000 24.85 31637 0.000 .127 .05 .117 .137 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  20.95 7320 0.000 .127 .06 .115 .139 
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Table 27 Two-Means Test for Social Disclosures versus Non-Disclosure 
Test Variable Word Count N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
Mean 
Loan Status Word Count > 1 31525 .85 .355 .002 
Word Count < 1 114 .82 .389 .036 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Loan Status Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
2-
tailed 
Mean 
Diff. 
Std. 
Error 
Diff. 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 
4.296 .038 1.092 31637 .275 .036 .033 -.029 .102 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  .996 113.680 .321 .036 .037 -.036 .109 
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A final model is constructed based on only the variables found significant for 
fully repaid loans. In Model 1, each significant variable is included without any selection 
filters. In Model 2, the loan Grade Group selection criteria are used to limit observations 
to only low-grade loans. In Model 3, only loans that contain social disclosures are 
selected. The results indicate that loan volume becomes insignificant across each model 
and the children attribute also loses significance in Model 1 and 2. Interestingly, the most 
significant social disclosure, Educational Explanation, becomes insignificant when 
observing only low-grade loans. Furthermore, the findings may indicate educational 
success is only a positive influence on the loan performance if the borrower is low-risk. 
In terms of performance, Model 2 modestly outperforms the null classification model 
percentage correct of 74.8% with a predicted model of 74.9%. Model 2 was also able to 
successfully predict 2.1% of the loans that would be Charged Off and was 99.4% correct 
in predicting Fully Paid loans. These findings suggest that social disclosures are more 
important for predicting the higher-risk borrowers. Compared to Model 1 and 3, these 
models failed to outperform the null classification model of 85.2%. Model 1 and Model 2 
each respectively predicted .9% of the loan Charge Offs and 99.9% of the Fully Paid 
loans. In other words, in the sample Model 1 was able to correctly predict 41 loan 
defaults out of 4,679 and Model 3 was able to predict 42 loan defaults out of 4,645 
Charged Off loans. The results of each model are provided in Table 28.  
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Table 28 Significant Variables Model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Exp(B) Std. Error Exp(B) Std. Error Exp(B) Std. Error 
Constant -3.441*** 0.947 -3.33* 1.770 -10.855*** 0.830 
qa_total 0.037*** 0.010 0.064*** 0.016 0.012 0.010 
misspellings -0.055*** 0.009 -0.058*** 0.015 -0.057*** 0.009 
hardworking 0.213*** 0.041 0.173** 0.075 0.243*** 0.041 
moral -0.1** 0.049 -0.097 0.089 -0.103** 0.048 
credit_combo 0.16*** 0.037 0.259*** 0.071 0.164*** 0.037 
loan_combo 0.146*** 0.034 0.141** 0.064 0.143*** 0.034 
debt_combo 0.238*** 0.038 0.265*** 0.073 0.242*** 0.038 
edu_exp 0.423*** 0.127 0.179 0.204 0.39*** 0.127 
oth_rate_exp 0.409*** 0.082 0.562*** 0.159 0.429*** 0.081 
car 0.344*** 0.129 0.694** 0.326 0.47*** 0.131 
credit_card 0.278*** 0.064 0.096 0.126 0.377*** 0.064 
debt_consolidation 0.114** 0.051 0.038 0.094 0.205*** 0.051 
educational -0.242* 0.139 -0.455** 0.232 -0.276** 0.140 
major_purchase 0.398*** 0.101 0.401** 0.201 0.44*** 0.101 
small_business -0.593*** 0.079 -0.493*** 0.130 -0.741*** 0.078 
wedding 0.33** 0.136 0.395 0.240 0.321** 0.135 
loan_amount_req_log -0.537*** 0.070 -0.602*** 0.129 -0.75*** 0.070 
FICO_avg 0.006*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.002 0.015*** 0.001 
dti -0.017*** 0.002 -0.009** 0.004 -0.018*** 0.002 
children -0.075 0.047 -0.069 0.082 -0.1** 0.047 
mthly_inc_log 0.929*** 0.080 0.673*** 0.150 1.07*** 0.079 
loan_vol_log -0.096 0.058 0.07 0.104 0.051 0.046 
consumer_sentiment -0.006** 0.003 -0.016*** 0.005 -0.011*** 0.003 
per_capita_wage_log 0.456*** 0.157 0.478 0.297 0.397** 0.157 
       
Cox & Snell R Square 0.062  0.041  0.055  
Nagelkerke R Square 0.110  0.061  0.097  
Number of 
Observations 
31,623  5,760  31545  
Notes: Table 28 provides the results of the binomial logistic regression for dependent variable Total 
Recovered Principal using Lending Club data. Model 1 includes the forms social disclosure variables; 
Model 2 includes the content variables.  Model 3 is the integration model with the forms of social 
disclosures and content variables. P-value of .10 is represented with a *, p-value of .05 of less is 
represented with two **, and p-value of .01 or less is represented with three ***. Cells with “-” indicate the 
areas that did not have adequate data to perform the analysis or variables not included in the model. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This study has examined the influence of social disclosures within fixed rate P2P 
lending from both a funding and repayment perspective. The results from the analysis of 
social disclosures can be summarized in two primary ways. First, the factors significant 
for funding a loan are inconsistent with the factors significant to repayment of the loan. 
Second, prescriptive filters based on social disclosures can improve the likelihood of 
selecting a creditworthy borrower.  
The social disclosures advantageous to borrowers are not always in the best 
interest of lenders. In terms of funding, H1, H2, H5 and H6 proved different forms of social 
disclosures and the specific content within the disclosure influence Duration times, Total 
Investment, and the Percent Investment. However, factors such as Education and Interest 
Rate on Other Debt were negatively associated with funding a loan in H5 and H6. These 
same two variables proved the most important to borrower repayment of the loan. These 
findings create a clear conflict between borrowers and lenders within P2P lending. For 
example, Poor Credit and Amount of Other Debt explanations are rewarded with higher 
levels of lender investment. Meanwhile educational success and obtaining a more 
beneficial interest rate are punished with lower levels of lender investment. Educational 
success demonstrates an ability to earn higher incomes, and a reduction in borrower 
interest rates increases the monthly cash flow necessary to service the debt. Both of these 
factors would reasonably improve a borrower’s ability to repay their debt obligations. In 
practice, it appears lenders base investment decisions on more compassionate or altruistic 
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social disclosures. For example, the Religious identity claim was the second most 
important claim in terms Percent Invested for retail and institutional lenders. Ironically, 
Religious claims also have the strongest negative relationship with the Total Recovered 
Principal. These findings may suggest that religious borrowers are less creditworthy than 
borrowers without religion. Alternatively, the findings may also indicate uncreditworthy 
borrowers unscrupulously make religious claims to appeal to religious lenders regardless 
of their ideological background. It also important to discuss that a subset of the variables 
significant for receiving funds are also predictors of loan performance.  
The study provides strong evidence that claiming to be Hardworking resonates 
with lenders and is a good indicator of a borrower’s true creditworthiness. I posit that 
there are intrinsic qualities associated with being Hardworking that share a strong 
correlation with creditworthiness. Being a hard worker may indicate the person is willing 
to work and sacrifice more in order to repay their debts. In addition to a borrower 
claiming Hardworking characteristics, exhibiting these same characteristics on the 
platform indicates credit worthiness.  
This study produces findings that reveal prescriptive ways borrowers indicate 
creditworthiness through different forms of social disclosure on the loan listing.  The 
results suggest it is advantageous for borrowers to invest time into well-written loan 
descriptions and remain engaged with potential lenders. Variables such as Updates, 
Questions Answered, and Flesch Index improve a borrowers funding amount from retail 
and institutional investors while lowering the time required to receive the loan. Deeper 
analysis of each of these variables demonstrate borrowers that Update their listing five 
times or have a readability score over 125 are more likely to fully pay their loan. The 
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work required to Update loan listings or develop clear and concise loan descriptions 
maybe akin to the qualities found in Hardworking individuals. For example, each 
Question Answered increases the Total Recovered Principal by roughly 2.5%.  
Answering questions requires effort and borrowers that work hard to obtain funding 
appear to also be the same individuals working hard to repay their debts. Quite the 
opposite, Lenders should also observe the effort the borrower places into the loan 
description in terms of Misspellings. Careless mistakes may be indicative of a lack of 
hard work and consistently indicated higher risk and poorer credit borrowers.  In the 
analysis of Misspellings, the model outperforms the null classification model when there 
are five or more Misspellings in a loan description. Furthermore, Misspellings reduce the 
Total Recovered Principal by up to 3% per error.  Borrowers that take the time to proof 
read their writing and respond to lender questions are statistically more likely to repay 
their debt obligations. The importance of these results and the methodology used in this 
research is of increased importance given the changing direction in P2P lending. 
Based on this study, social disclosures enable retail and institutional investors to 
separate good and bad borrowers. However, as of December 10, 2015 the loan 
description as well as question and answer fields were removed from the Lending Club 
platform for security and privacy issues. Lending Club Lending Club stated the change 
was necessary to prevent borrowers from publishing personally identifiable information. 
As a result, social disclosures are an endangered financial innovation on fixed-rate P2P 
platforms. Social disclosures contributed to the “peer” qualities of the platform and these 
changes may now reduce some lenders’ ability to determine borrower creditworthiness. 
Social disclosures represent a financial innovation facilitating the democratization of 
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finance to more investors and bridging the human interaction found in traditional banking 
relationships. Dissemination of these findings are of increased importance in light of the 
Lending Club platform policy change, and to advocate the advantages of keeping “peer” 
interaction within P2P lending.  
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